The Shareholder Approval Conundrum by Gevurtz, Franklin A.
Boston College Law Review 
Volume 60 Issue 7 Article 2 
10-30-2019 
The Shareholder Approval Conundrum 
Franklin A. Gevurtz 
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, fgevurtz@pacific.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, and 
the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Shareholder Approval Conundrum, 60 B.C.L. Rev. 1831 (2019), 
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol60/iss7/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College 
Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu. 
  1831 
THE SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL 
CONUNDRUM 
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1832 
I. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY AND SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL ............................................................ 1837 
A. The Judicial Scrutiny Layer Cake .................................................................................... 1837 
B. The Traditional Impact of Shareholder Approval ............................................................ 1841 
II. CHANGING THE GAME IN CORWIN ........................................................................................ 1844 
A. Reaching Out to Address Shareholder Approval .............................................................. 1844 
B. Problems Following Corwin ............................................................................................ 1847 
1. Problems from Corwin’s Prerequisites ........................................................................ 1847 
2. Corwin’s Messy Impact on the Judicial Scrutiny Layer Cake ..................................... 1857 
III. BACK TO FIRST PRINCIPLES: WHAT IS SHAREHOLDER  APPROVAL TELLING US? .............. 1878 
A. The Nature of the Shareholders’ Choice .......................................................................... 1878 
B. Implications for Judicial Scrutiny .................................................................................... 1879 
1. Binary Choice and Corwin’s Prerequisites .................................................................. 1879 
2. Binary Choice and Functional Equivalence ................................................................. 1882 
3. Comparing Litigation: The Problem of Second-Best Solutions ................................... 1890 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 1892 
 
  1832 
THE SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL 
CONUNDRUM 
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ* 
Abstract: This Article explores the conundrum resulting from the fact that 
shareholders almost invariably vote to approve corporate mergers and sales by 
overwhelming margins, while, at the same time, most larger mergers and sales 
trigger multiple lawsuits by shareholders claiming that directors breached their 
fiduciary duty to get the best price for the shareholders. The conventional ex-
planation for this phenomenon is that attorneys are bringing meritless claims. 
Reflecting this view, the Delaware Supreme Court, in its pivotal Corwin deci-
sion, declared that an informed and uncoerced shareholder vote in favor of a 
merger should lead courts to be dismissive of claims that directors breached 
their fiduciary duty in making the deal. Yet, studies have found that corporate 
managers, in fact, often sacrifice getting the best deal for the shareholders in 
favor of deals that maintain the managers’ positions and enhance their compen-
sation. This, in turn, suggests that the conventional wisdom is too facile and 
raises a deeper factual conundrum: Why would shareholders vote for deals that 
sacrifice their interests? This Article presents an answer to this question. It sets 
forth a model of decision making contrasting narrow binary decisions with nu-
anced or flexible decisions and shows how the narrow binary nature of share-
holder votes explains the conundrum of shareholders approving deals that sac-
rifice their interest in getting the best price. Addressing the doctrinal impact of 
this answer, this Article sets out the unintended consequences, unanswered 
questions, and doctrinal anomalies plaguing Delaware law regarding share-
holder approval following Corwin and shows how this Article’s central insight 
regarding shareholder approval paves the way to clear up these doctrinal prob-
lems. 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate mergers and acquisitions are over a trillion dollar a year busi-
ness.1 Ideally, the shareholders’ receipt of the highest price in such transac-
tions not only makes the shareholders happy and thereby contributes to their 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2019, Franklin A. Gevurtz. All rights reserved. 
 * Distinguished Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I wish 
to thank my colleagues, Brian Slocum, John Sprankling, and Leslie Jacobs for their helpful com-
ments. 
 1 See, e.g., Dan Primack, 2017 Was a Record Year for Mergers and Acquisitions, AXIOS (Jan. 
3, 2018), https://www.axios.com/2017-was-a-record-year-for-mergers-and-acquisitions-1515111011-
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willingness to invest and grow the economy, but also facilitates economic 
efficiency by moving business assets to the party who places the highest value 
on them.2 The boom in corporate mergers and acquisitions has also generated 
a correspondingly booming legal business through the constant stream of lit-
igation challenging most board decisions to enter such transactions.3 Plain-
tiffs cast these actions as a contest between victimized shareholders and faith-
less directors who failed to act reasonably to get the shareholders the best 
price.4 Yet, merging or selling a corporation normally requires approval by 
the shareholders,5 who rarely vote down the deal.6 What explains this appar-
ent incongruity between what plaintiff shareholders assert and how most 
shareholders vote? 
Answering this question has substantial doctrinal and policy signifi-
cance. Corporate law normally grants large discretion to directors to make 
corporate decisions without input from the shareholders and, under the busi-
ness judgment rule, dismisses shareholder complaints about decisions that 
directors make.7 Corporate mergers and sales, however, receive different 
                                                                                                                           
18f57e07-c188-4e35-a770-f7a749500531.html [https://perma.cc/J7XR-V39K] (noting that U.S. 
mergers and acquisitions were valued at $1.4 trillion in 2017 and $1.7 trillion in 2016). 
 2 See John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory 
and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 377 (2000) (theorizing that lockup provisions that foreclose 
the possibility of sale to a higher bidder breed economic inefficiency by preventing corporate assets 
from moving to higher-valuing parties). 
 3 See Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 603, 
607–08 (2018) (explaining that the vast majority of mergers valued at over $100 million trigger 
shareholder lawsuits). 
 4 See id. at 611 (“Most merger lawsuits include claims for breach of fiduciary duty, including 
allegations that the board failed to adhere to its duty under Revlon to maximize shareholder value.”). 
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court held that if 
the break-up of a corporation is inevitable, the board of directors inherits the duty to maximize the 
shareholders’ benefit upon sale. See 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
 5 See infra notes 57–58 (citing Delaware statutes requiring shareholder approval in order to 
merge or sell a corporation). 
 6 See Matteo Gatti, Reconsidering the Merger Process: Approval Patterns, Timeline, and 
Shareholders’ Role, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 854 (2018) (showing that shareholders rejected only a 
little over one percent of arms-length mergers involving a Russell 3000 target company from 2006 
to 2015); see also John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Blake Rohrbacher, Paying for the Privilege of Inde-
pendence: Termination Fees Triggered by “Naked No Votes,” 21 INSIGHTS 10, 11 (2007) (noting 
that the shareholder rejection of the Lear-Icahn merger in 2007 was only the eighth time between 
2003 and 2007 that shareholders voted down a merger out of the over 1,000 submitted for share-
holder approval). 
 7 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2011 & Supp. 2018) (providing that a cor-
poration is to be managed by or under the direction of the board of directors); see also Sinclair Oil 
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (stating that the board of directors’ decisions are 
presumed to be reasonable and “will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational busi-
ness purpose”). 
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treatment. As just mentioned, corporate law generally requires that share-
holders approve such transactions. Moreover, Delaware corporate law—
which governs most litigation challenging directors’ agreements to merge or 
sell public companies8—often calls for more careful judicial scrutiny of 
whether directors acted reasonably in entering such agreements.9 The result 
is a pair of double checks on directors’ decisions to merge or sell a company. 
Explaining the apparent incongruity between the claims of plaintiff 
shareholders and how most shareholders vote is key to resolving whether this 
pair of double checks creates an undesirable redundancy. The explanation 
pressed by the corporate bar and many corporate law scholars is simply that 
a number of attorneys with nothing better to do have developed a business 
model consisting of bringing meritless claims challenging mergers with the 
hope of profiting through settlements generating attorney’s fees.10 The result 
of paying the attorney’s fees in such settlements, as well as litigation costs 
and the costs of unnecessary process aimed at approving appearances in ex-
pected litigation, is to impose a transaction tax on corporate mergers11 that 
ultimately comes at the expense of the shareholders ostensibly championed 
in such litigation. Under this view of the world, courts should look to how 
shareholders vote, rather than what plaintiffs claim. 
In Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, the Delaware Supreme 
Court took what proponents see as a welcome step toward implementing this 
worldview.12 The court stated that an informed and uncoerced vote by the 
shareholders to approve a merger or sale of a company invokes the deferential 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See In re Crown Castle Int’l Corp., 247 S.W.3d 349, 352 (Tex. App. 2008) (stating that Del-
aware substantive law governs the internal affairs of Delaware corporations); Liz Hoffman, Dole 
and Other Companies Sour on Delaware as Corporate Haven, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2, 2015), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/dole-and-other-companies-sour-on-delaware-as-corporate-haven-14385695
07 [https://perma.cc/K3F9-9RZV] (noting that 54% of public companies are incorporated in Dela-
ware). 
 9 See infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text (discussing various circumstances where mer-
gers or sales trigger higher scrutiny from the courts). 
 10 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An 
Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 566–67 (2015) [hereinafter 
Peppercorn Settlement] (condemning “disclosure-only” settlements because they often provide 
monetary rewards to the plaintiffs’ attorneys but nothing of value to the plaintiff-shareholders); 
Gregory A. Markel & Gillian G. Burns, Assessing a Judicial Solution to Abusive Merger Litigation, 
LAW360 (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/728061/assessing-a-judicial-solution-
to-abusive-merger-litigation (“[L]awsuits are filed after virtually every public merger is announced, 
in many cases with little regard to the merits of the claim.”). 
 11 See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, The Reconfiguring of Revlon, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MER-
GERS AND ACQUISITIONS 263, 278 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016) (stating 
that attorney’s fees in settlements of cases challenging mergers “essentially represent a kind of 
transactional ‘excise’ tax”). 
 12 125 A.3d 304, 308–09 (Del. 2015). 
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business judgment rule in litigation challenging the deal, at least when the 
deal does not involve a controlling shareholder on the other side.13 
Yet, there is evidence that this explanation of the incongruity, and ac-
cordingly Corwin’s solution, is too facile. Studies have found that corporate 
management, in choosing merger partners and negotiating deals, often ap-
proaches the matter by following the adage “one door closes, another door 
opens.”14 Specifically, management often sacrifices getting the best price for 
the shareholders in favor of mergers or sales in which the current manage-
ment retains positions or gains in compensation.15 These studies, in turn, raise 
an empirical conundrum: If deals often sacrifice their interest, why do share-
holders almost always overwhelmingly vote for the deals? 
Perhaps it is because shareholders are misled or forced. If so, we might 
find suitable reassurance in Corwin’s twin prerequisites for according favor-
able impact to shareholder approval: that the shareholders are fully informed 
and are not coerced. Yet, this explanation, too, is unsatisfying. 
Research has indicated that shareholders do not significantly change 
their votes when litigation forces the disclosure of additional negative facts 
about deals; rather, shareholders continue to approve the deals by over-
whelming margins.16 Indeed, such research reinforces a growing perception 
that litigation producing additional disclosure serves largely to enrich lawyers 
with little gain for shareholders.17 This, in turn, suggests that Corwin’s impact 
of increasing litigation’s focus on whether the shareholders were fully in-
formed is a bug, not a feature. 
As far as whether shareholders are voting for deals sacrificing their in-
terests because they are coerced, this may depend on what one means by co-
ercion. Unfortunately, Delaware courts have yet to come up with a workable 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Id. 
 14 See, e.g., Julie Wulf, Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from “Mer-
gers of Equals,” 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 60, 75–80 (2004) (noting the prevalence of mergers that 
involve directors and officers of the target company who remain as managers of the surviving com-
pany). 
 15 See id. at 94 (finding that management of merging corporations exchange lower premiums 
for employment in the surviving entity or other benefits); see also Jay C. Hartzell et al., What’s in 
It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 REV.  FIN. STUD. 37, 51–56 (2004) (finding that 
management of selling corporations exchange lower premiums for generous compensation pack-
ages). 
 16 See infra notes 121–122 and accompanying text (discussing the results of a study that ana-
lyzed shareholders’ decisions to approve mergers when they were presented with negative infor-
mation compared with situations involving no such disclosure). 
 17 See, e.g., Peppercorn Settlement, supra note 10, at 566–67 (criticizing state merger litigation 
that focuses on nondisclosure claims for producing settlements that pay off plaintiffs’ attorneys 
despite achieving nothing of value for shareholders). 
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definition.18 Even more unfortunately, this may be a function of the impossi-
bility of the task. 
In the end, it is unclear how much the court in Corwin itself believes in 
the power of informed and uncoerced shareholder votes to fully protect share-
holders. This is because the case contains a doctrinal anomaly, that, in the 
spirit of this Article, we can label as the Corwin conundrum. In the same 
analysis in which the court stated that a shareholder vote of approval lowers 
the standard for reviewing the deal to the minimalist guidelines of the busi-
ness judgment rule, the court also suggested that greater scrutiny of whether 
directors picked the best deal remains available for actions seeking to enjoin 
the transaction before the shareholders vote.19 Yet, why on earth would a 
court apply extra careful scrutiny of a board’s decision for purposes of block-
ing a shareholder vote that would cause the court to defer to the board’s de-
cision without such careful scrutiny, particularly if the court believed in the 
protective power of shareholder approval? 
This Article provides a very different explanation for the conundrum of 
shareholders voting for deals in which management may have sacrificed their 
interest. It does so by constructing a model of decision making that contrasts 
narrow binary decisions (a light switch that is either on or off) from nuanced 
or flexible decisions in which the decisionmaker has a number of choices (a 
control panel with numerous dials and switches) and can make related deci-
sions over time. Shareholder votes to approve mergers or sales constitute nar-
row binary decisions in which the rational shareholder will vote for any deal 
presenting a significantly better price than the market, even in situations in 
which a party, able to make nuanced or flexible decisions, would rationally 
choose a different course in pursuit of an even better deal. In other words, 
shareholders vote for deals that are better than no deal at all, even in situations 
in which directors may have sacrificed the shareholders’ interest in getting 
the best deal. This means that shareholder approval does not remove the need 
for more careful judicial scrutiny when there are grounds for concern about 
the directors’ motives in agreeing to a merger or acquisition. 
The roadmap to this conclusion follows a common pattern. Part I of this 
Article provides, for those less familiar with the area, a brief overview of the 
different layers of scrutiny applied by Delaware courts when reviewing chal-
lenges to board decisions and the impacts of shareholder approval on such 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See infra notes 136–147 and accompanying text (observing the Delaware courts’ inability to 
define coercion). 
 19 See Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312 (stating that greater scrutiny is a “tool of injunctive relief” to 
analyze the reasonableness of important mergers and acquisitions before closing but was not in-
tended to be used for money damages). 
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scrutiny prior to Corwin.20 Part II looks at Corwin.21 Specifically, after de-
scribing the decision, it explores the unintended consequences, unanswered 
questions, and doctrinal conundrum generated by the decision.22 Part III sets 
out this Article’s explanation for the empirical conundrum of why sharehold-
ers approve deals that sacrifice their interests and discusses the implications 
of this explanation.23 Specifically, Part III explains the impact of the narrow 
binary nature of the shareholders’ decision and how this prevents shareholder 
approval from serving as a complete substitute for more careful judicial scru-
tiny of board decisions to merge or sell the corporation. Moreover, Part III 
points out an overlooked potential advantage of judicial scrutiny when 
viewed in light of this model of decision making. Specifically, courts, unlike 
shareholders, can make nuanced or flexible decisions (particularly when it 
comes to injunctive relief). These insights, in turn, light a path for cleaning 
up the doctrinal problems plaguing Delaware law that governs the impact of 
shareholder approval. 
I. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY AND SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL 
In order to understand the impact of the shareholder approval conun-
drum, a bit of background regarding judicial scrutiny of board decisions and 
the traditional role of shareholder approval might be helpful. 
A. The Judicial Scrutiny Layer Cake 
Paralleling constitutional law, the level of scrutiny applied by a court 
when reviewing a challenged decision by a corporate board commonly has a 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See discussion infra Part I. 
 21 See discussion infra Part II. 
 22 See, e.g., Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 151–52 (Del. 2016) (addressing Corwin’s 
impact on transactions already subject to the business judgment rule); In re MeadWestvaco Stock-
holders Litig., 168 A.3d 675, 684 (Del. Ch. 2017) (raising but leaving unanswered the question of 
whether shareholder approval under Corwin cleanses the directors’ lack of good faith); Paramount 
Gold & Silver Stockholders Litig., No. 10499-CB, 2017 WL 1372659, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 13, 
2017) (raising the question of whether shareholder approval under Corwin lowers the standard for 
reviewing deal protections from Unocal to the business judgment rule); Larkin v. Shah, No. 10918-
VCS, 2016 WL 4485447, at *10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2016) (addressing whether Corwin changes the 
impact of shareholder approval on scrutiny of mergers in which directors, but not controlling share-
holders, have a conflict of interest); In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 741–47 
(Del. Ch. 2016) (addressing whether accepting a tender offer pursuant to § 251(h) of Delaware’s 
corporation statute has the same consequences as a shareholder vote for purposes of Corwin); In re 
Zale Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. CV 9388-VCP, 2015 WL 6551418, at *2–4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 
2015) (addressing the impact of shareholder approval under Corwin on claims against investment 
bankers for aiding and abetting a breach of duty by the board). 
 23 See discussion infra Part III. 
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critical impact upon the plaintiff’s chances of success.24 Traditionally, de-
pending upon whether one or more of the directors have a conflict of interest 
in the matter under review, courts apply one of two basic standards. 
In the absence of a conflict of interest, courts normally apply the busi-
ness judgment rule.25 Although interpretations of the business judgment rule 
diverge,26 the essence of nearly every current interpretation of the rule is to 
accord directors with greater protection against judicial second-guessing than 
virtually any other private actor in our society.27 Hence, almost no court 
would hold directors liable for their decision simply because the decision was 
unreasonable.28 On the contrary, Delaware courts have held that the standard 
under the business judgment rule for imposing liability on directors for dis-
interested decisions is gross negligence.29 
Traditionally, the principal exception to application of the business judg-
ment rule occurs when the board’s decision involves a conflict of interest for 
some or all of the directors or parties controlling the directors.30 In this event, 
unless shareholders or directors without a conflict vote to approve the trans-
action after full disclosure, courts apply the fairness test.31 Under this test, 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1988) (“[B]ecause 
the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule is so powerful and the standard of 
entire fairness so exacting, the determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review fre-
quently is determinative of the outcome of derivative litigation.”) (quoting AC Acquisitions Corp. 
v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986)). 
 25 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (explaining that courts apply the busi-
ness judgment rule as long as the directors did not appear on both sides of a transaction and made a 
fully informed decision). 
 26 See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided 
Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 289–303 (1994) (discussing the various interpretations of the 
business judgment rule). 
 27 See generally Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: 
Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398, 400–02 (2007) 
(discussing the scenarios in which courts are willing to review directors’ conduct under the business 
judgment rule, yet noting that “a large swath of director conduct . . . is unreviewable”). 
 28 See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Whereas an automobile driver who 
makes a mistake in judgment as to speed or distance injuring a pedestrian will likely be called upon 
to respond in damages, a corporate officer who makes a mistake in judgment as to economic condi-
tions, consumer tastes or production line efficiency will rarely, if ever, be found liable for damages 
suffered by the corporation.”). 
 29 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (confirming that the standard of 
review to determine whether a board of directors’ actions violate the business judgment rule is gross 
negligence). 
 30 See Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720–21 (explaining that the intrinsic fairness standard, not the busi-
ness judgment rule, is used where directors are engaged in self-dealing or are otherwise conflicted). 
 31 See In re Inv’rs Bancorp, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 177 A.3d 1208, 1211 (Del. 2017) (stating 
that the entire fairness test is applied in the absence of shareholder ratification of a transaction in 
which the directors have a conflict of interest). 
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proponents of the transaction must prove to a skeptical court that the transac-
tion was fair32—essentially that the corporation or shareholders received as 
good a deal as if dealing with a stranger.33 This bifurcated approach reflects 
a policy that the degree of judicial scrutiny over board decisions should de-
pend upon the extent that one can trust the directors to act for the right mo-
tives (even if not always with the best results). 
Over the years, developments in Delaware law have splintered the levels 
of possible judicial scrutiny beyond this bifurcated approach. Starting at the 
low end, in response to a 1985 judicial decision holding directors liable to 
shareholders due to their gross negligence in agreeing to a merger,34 the Del-
aware legislature added Section 102(b)(7) to Delaware’s corporation stat-
ute.35 This section allows companies to place in their certificate of incorpo-
ration a provision waiving liability of directors for monetary damages for 
breach of certain fiduciary duties.36 The section, however, does not allow 
waivers for all misconduct.37 Notably, the provision does not allow a corpo-
ration to waive director liability for disloyal acts or acts not in good faith.38 
As a result, the impact of a Section 102(b)(7) waiver on judicial review of 
disinterested board decisions in an action seeking damages is to change the 
standard from gross negligence to lack of good faith.39 The Delaware Su-
preme Court characterized the good faith standard applicable when selling a 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See, e.g., Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720 (stating that under the fairness standard, the burden is on 
the conflicted party to prove that “its transactions . . . were objectively fair”). 
 33 See Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 225 (Del. 1976) (holding that a transaction involving 
interested directors was entirely fair because an independent corporation in the same position also 
would have performed the same transaction). 
 34 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893 (holding that directors who were grossly negligent in 
failing to fully inform themselves of all information reasonably available to them before approving 
a merger were liable to shareholders to the extent that the transaction was not fair). 
 35 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2011 & Supp. 2018); see also In re Walt Disney 
Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 751–52 (Del. Ch. 2005) (explaining that the Delaware legisla-
ture “acted swiftly” in response to the Van Gorkom decision by enacting § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware 
corporate law). 
 36 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). 
 37 See id. (listing certain fiduciary duties for which a director’s liability may not be eliminated 
or limited by a corporation’s certificate of incorporation). 
 38 See id. (allowing a corporation to eliminate director liability, except: “(i) For any breach of 
the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in 
good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law . . . or (iv) for any 
transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit”).  
 39 See Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate Directors: 
The Disney Standard and the “New” Good Faith, 56 AM. U.L. REV. 211, 232–34 (2006) (noting 
that because § 102(b)(7) effectively “sounded the death knell of the duty of care” claim, plaintiffs 
shifted towards arguing that directors breached their duty of good faith).  
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corporation with a Section 102(b)(7) waiver as “whether th[e] directors ut-
terly failed to attempt to obtain the best sale price.”40 
In between the business judgment rule and the fairness test, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court added middle levels of heightened scrutiny for certain 
situations involving mergers and acquisitions. This began with the court’s 
decision in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., when it addressed actions 
by directors to defend against a hostile tender offer.41 Recognizing “the om-
nipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests”42 
in seeking to fend off a tender offer that would remove the current directors 
from power, the Delaware Supreme Court established a two-part test to re-
view directors’ decisions to employ takeover defenses. Under the first part of 
this test the directors must prove that they possessed reasonable grounds for 
believing a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness existed from the hos-
tile tender offer.43 The second part of the test requires that the defensive meas-
ure used be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.44 As elaborated by a 
subsequent decision, this proportionality element, in turn, requires that take-
over defenses not be coercive or preclusive, and be within a range of reason-
able responses.45 
Mergers or sales transferring control of the corporation to an individual 
or privately held entity,46 as well as arguably any merger or sale substantially 
cashing out the existing shareholders47—which, in either event, turn out to 
encompass the majority of litigated mergers and sales48—trigger the doctrine 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 244 (Del. 2009). This assumes that a plaintiff 
attempts to show a lack of good faith from a lack of effort as opposed to that a director acted out of 
bad motives. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 684 (Del. Ch. 2014) (explaining that 
Lyondell’s “utterly disregarded” language does not preclude a plaintiff from seeking to show bad 
faith by showing that directors acted for improper purposes). 
 41 See 493 A.2d 946, 954–56 (Del. 1985) (establishing an enhanced scrutiny test for courts to 
apply to board actions defending against a corporate takeover). 
 42 Id. at 954. 
 43 Id. at 955–56. 
 44 Id.  
 45 See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386–88 (Del. 1995) (recognizing that 
Delaware courts consistently recognize directors’ coercive or preclusive actions to prevent a takeo-
ver bid, as well as actions outside of a “range of reasonableness,” to be in violation of their fiduciary 
duties). 
 46 See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46–48 (Del. 1994) 
(stating that transactions resulting in a change of corporate control trigger the Revlon standard). 
 47 See, e.g., In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 
2028076, at *13 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011) (applying the Revlon standard to assess the sale of a 
corporation where consideration was 50% in cash and 50% in stock); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders 
Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 732 (Del. Ch. 1999) (suggesting that the Revlon standard should apply in 
transactions where 62% of the consideration is in cash). 
 48 E.g., Steven M. Davidoff & Christina M. Sautter, Lock-up Creep, 38 J. CORP. L. 681, 702 
(2013). 
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created by the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.49 The precise impact of applying this doctrine 
to a board decision is opaque.50 Generally speaking, however, the doctrine 
calls for heightened judicial scrutiny of whether the board acted reasonably 
to obtain the best price for the shareholders.51 
Another variant of the middle level of scrutiny applied by Delaware 
courts in the mergers and acquisitions context involves so-called deal protec-
tions.52 These are provisions in the merger or acquisition contract, such as 
termination fees or other actions by the board, that protect the initial buyer or 
merger partner against a later prospective buyer offering a higher price to the 
shareholders before the shareholders have a chance to vote on the deal agreed 
to by the board. In Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., the Delaware Su-
preme Court held that Unocal provides the appropriate standard for review-
ing challenges to deal protections, at least when Revlon does not apply.53 
Finally, although not technically constituting judicial scrutiny of the 
board’s agreement to a merger, appraisal rights create an indirect judicial 
scrutiny of mergers. Delaware’s corporation statute grants shareholders dis-
senting from a merger, with various exceptions, the right to demand that the 
corporation cashes them out at a judicially determined fair value (hence the 
term appraisal rights).54 The comparison of this judicially determined fair 
market value to the agreed merger price serves as an indirect judicial review 
of the merger. 
B. The Traditional Impact of Shareholder Approval 
The basic model of corporate governance is republican: Shareholders 
have the power to choose directors55 and directors have the power to make 
managerial decisions.56 Merging or selling the corporation departs from this 
                                                                                                                           
 49 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).  
 50 See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Removing Revlon, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1528–45 (2013) 
(discussing various possible effects of Revlon). 
 51 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (“The duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation 
of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stock-
holders’ benefit.”). 
 52 See Thanos Panagopoulos, Thinking Inside the Box: Analyzing Judicial Scrutiny of Deal 
Protection Devices in Delaware, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 437, 453–55 (2006) (discussing the impact 
of enhanced scrutiny on deal protection devices used by corporations). 
 53 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 928–30 (Del. 2003) (applying the 
Unocal standard to review the board of directors’ decision to enter into a deal protection that fore-
closed consideration of subsequent offers rather than the Revlon standard because the transaction 
did not result in a change of control). 
 54 DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 262(West 2011 & Supp. 2018). 
 55 DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 216(3) (West 2011). 
 56 DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2011 & Supp. 2018). 
1842 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1831 
model. Corporation statutes require a vote of approval by a corporation’s 
shareholders for a sale of substantially all of the company’s assets57 and, with 
limited exceptions, for a merger of the corporation.58 
In addition to being a necessary predicate for merging or selling a cor-
poration, shareholder approval of a transaction has long impacted the level of 
scrutiny applied by courts to claims that directors breached their duty of loy-
alty when contracting with their corporation. Specifically, corporation stat-
utes59 and long-standing judicial doctrine60 establish that a vote of the share-
holders approving a transaction can remove the taint created by a conflict of 
interest among some or all of the board members, thereby returning the re-
view from fairness to the business judgment rule or to a standard referred to 
as waste.61 Achieving this impact is predicated upon full disclosure and,62 
despite some unfortunate drafting in Delaware’s statute,63 entails an affirma-
tive vote by shareholders who do not have a conflicting interest in the trans-
action, rather than a vote pushed across by the shareholders who do.64 
A decade ago, a question arose about the overlap between these two util-
ities of shareholder approval under Delaware law. Specifically, in Gantler v. 
                                                                                                                           
 57 DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 271(a) (West 2011). 
 58 DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 251(c) (West 2011 & Supp. 2018). 
 59 See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (West 2011) (providing that a transaction is not void 
where a director’s material interest is disclosed or known to the shareholders and the shareholders 
approve the transaction in good faith). 
 60 See In re Inv’rs Bancorp, 177 A.3d at 1211 (confirming that the standard of review for a 
challenged board action is the business judgment rule if the action was ratified by the stockholders); 
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58 (Del. 1952) (stating that where a board’s decision 
was ratified by stockholders, the court will consider the waste of corporate assets instead of em-
ploying the entire fairness standard). Consideration of waste differs from the business judgment rule 
in that it asks whether the decision is so irrational that it amounts to giving away corporate assets 
but does not ask about due care in making the decision. See Gottlieb, 91 A.2d at 59. 
 61 See Gottlieb, 91 A.2d at 58–59 (applying the waste standard rather than the business judg-
ment rule). In part, this focus might reflect the notion that the business judgment rule requires some 
degree of care, like avoiding gross negligence by being adequately informed when making a deci-
sion, and shareholders have no duty of care. It also reflects the notion that even a majority of share-
holders may not give away corporate assets without any business purpose over the objections of 
minority shareholders. See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591–93 (1933) (applying the waste stand-
ard instead of the business judgment rule while clarifying that a majority of shareholders may not 
give away corporate property such that it would constitute misuse and a waste). 
 62 See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (requiring all material facts of the director’s interest 
to be disclosed or known to the shareholders); In re Inv’rs Bancorp, 177 A.3d at 1211 (stating that 
shareholders must be fully informed, not coerced, and disinterested in order to ratify a board action). 
 63 As written, Delaware’s statute does not explicitly state that approval must come from disin-
terested shareholders in order for shareholder approval to preclude voidability of a conflict of inter-
est transaction. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 144(a)(2). 
 64 See Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976) (stating that ratification of the 
board’s action by a majority of interested shareholders does not move the standard of review from 
the fairness test to the business judgment rule). 
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Stephens, the Delaware Supreme Court indulged in an arcane terminological 
disputation about ratification versus statutorily mandated approvals.65 The 
court concluded that a statutorily required shareholder vote to approve an 
amendment to the corporation’s certificate of incorporation in the case did 
not ratify the conflicted decision of directors to propose the amendment, 
thereby blocking the plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the directors’ duty of loy-
alty.66 Because the solicitation seeking the shareholders’ proxies in favor of 
the amendment contained misleading statements, this whole discussion was 
probably just dicta. Nevertheless, it seemingly created the prospect that stat-
utorily required shareholder votes to approve mergers and the like would 
have no impact on the level of judicial scrutiny.67 
A different impact arises with conflict of interest transactions involving 
controlling shareholders. The Delaware Supreme Court has held that ap-
proval of such transactions by a majority of the other shareholders—a so-
called majority-of-the-minority approval—shifts the burden of proof on fair-
ness from the controlling shareholder to the complaining minority sharehold-
ers.68 Nevertheless, the court will still subject the transaction to the careful 
scrutiny of the fairness test instead of applying the business judgment rule.69 
Although this burden shift might be helpful to the controlling shareholder in 
close cases, it has nowhere near the dramatic impact of shifting the level of 
scrutiny from fairness to the business judgment rule.70 More recently, how-
ever, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that approval by both a commit-
tee of independent directors and a majority of the minority shareholders can 
return scrutiny of transactions with controlling shareholders, such as a freeze-
out merger in which the majority shareholder boots out the minority, to the 
business judgment rule.71 
Shareholder approval might also impact judicial scrutiny of transactions 
in which neither directors nor parties that control directors have a traditional 
conflict of interest. For example, the Delaware Supreme Court has suggested 
that approval of a merger by shareholders who are aware of the board’s gross 
                                                                                                                           
 65 965 A.2d 695, 712–14 (Del. 2009).  
 66 See id. 
 67 For an extended discussion of Gantler, see J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Shareholder Ap-
proval on Enhanced Scrutiny, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1443, 1477–83 (2014). 
 68 Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994). 
 69 Id. 
 70 See Mills Acquisition, 559 A.2d at 1279 (explaining the influence the standard of review has 
on the judicial decision). 
 71 See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (holding that the business 
judgment rule is appropriate where a merger transaction is approved by both a committee of inde-
pendent directors and a majority of the minority shareholders). 
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negligence can preclude a claim against the directors for breaching their duty 
of care.72 
The Delaware Supreme Court has also dabbled with the impact of share-
holder approval of takeover defenses. Specifically, in Williams v. Geier, the 
court addressed the standard of scrutiny it would apply to a takeover defense 
adopted through a shareholder vote to amend the company’s certificate of 
incorporation.73 In deciding that the business judgment rule, rather than Un-
ocal, governed the matter, the court explained that Unocal applies to unilat-
eral board actions to defend against hostile takeovers, but not to actions that 
receive approval from the shareholders.74 On the other hand, in In re Santa 
Fe Corp. Shareholder Litigation, the Delaware Supreme Court made it clear 
that the shareholders must actually be voting on the takeover defense in order 
to shift the level of scrutiny from Unocal.75 There, the court rejected the di-
rectors’ assertion that approval of the board’s favored merger by the share-
holders effectively approved the board’s employment of takeover defenses 
against a competing bidder.76 
II. CHANGING THE GAME IN CORWIN 
The centerpiece of Delaware law regarding the impact of shareholder 
approval on judicial review of board decisions to merge or sell the company 
(when the decision does not involve a controlling shareholder on the other 
side) is the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Corwin v. KKR Financial 
Holdings LLC. This makes it necessary to describe this decision and explore 
the unintended consequences, unanswered questions, and doctrinal anoma-
lies resulting from the decision. 
A. Reaching Out to Address Shareholder Approval 
Corwin is an odd case to have the impact claimed for it because it is 
unclear whether the court’s discussion of the impact of shareholder approval 
was all that relevant, let alone necessary, to the resolution of the situation 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 889–90 (stating that a merger agreement can be upheld, re-
gardless of the board’s breach of its duty of care, if it is approved by a majority of informed share-
holders). 
 73 671 A.2d 1368, 1377–79 (Del. 1996). 
 74 See id. at 1377 (explaining that Unocal is used only when a board acts without shareholder 
approval in adopting defensive measures in response to a perceived outside threat). 
 75 See In re Santa Fe Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 68 (Del. 1995) (holding that the share-
holders did not ratify the board’s defensive measures against a takeover bid because the shareholder 
vote did not refer to the defensive measure at issue, but rather “merely offered a choice between” 
the merger and inaction). 
 76 See id. (stating that a vote to approve a merger is not a vote to ratify takeover defenses that 
cut off a competing buyer). 
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before the court. The case involved a merger between a publicly traded lim-
ited liability company (KKR Financial Holdings LLC) and a publicly traded 
limited partnership (KKR & Co. L.P.).77 The merger agreement called for the 
LLC’s owners to exchange their ownership shares in the LLC for ownership 
shares in the limited partnership78 in a ratio that represented a substantial pre-
mium (based upon market prices) for the LLC’s owners.79 Although a major-
ity of the LLC’s owners voted to approve the merger, some owners of the 
LLC sued.80 Their basic argument was that a management contract under 
which an affiliate of the limited partnership ran the day-to-day affairs of the 
LLC depressed the value of the LLC to other buyers and rendered the limited 
partnership a controlling owner of the LLC (even though its actual ownership 
in the LLC was less than one percent).81 
The case revolved around what standard the court should use to review 
the decision by the LLC’s managing board to merge.82 Even though the case 
involved fiduciary duties owed to the owners of an LLC, the parties treated 
the case as if governed by Delaware’s layer cake of standards for reviewing 
mergers by corporate directors and shareholders. Although it noted the pos-
sible difference in the law governing LLCs, the Delaware Supreme Court de-
cided to respect the litigants’ approach.83 The plaintiffs argued that the fair-
ness test applied based upon the theory that the limited partnership was a 
controlling owner of the LLC.84 The Chancery Court refused to hold that a 
party with only a minuscule ownership or voting power in a company was a 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 306–08 (Del. 2015). 
 78 Id. at 306.  
 79 Id. Although the exchange ratio was one-half share in the limited partnership for each share 
in the LLC, the market value of the received interest in the limited partnership was 35% more than 
the market value of the surrendered interest in the LLC. Id. Although the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
opinion refers to the owners as stockholders and the exchanged ownership interests as stock, the 
owners were not stockholders of, nor did they exchange stock in, a corporation. Instead, the owners 
were members in an LLC, which is what owners in an LLC are called. In reality, the so-called stock 
being exchanged consisted of membership interests in the LLC for limited partnership interests in 
the limited partnership. 
 80 See id. (noting that, despite the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, the challenged transaction was approved 
by a majority of the disinterested stockholders). 
 81 Id. A termination fee allegedly deterred the LLC from ending this relationship. See In re 
KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 994 (Del. Ch. 2014) (reciting plaintiffs’ 
claim that the target company was unattractive on the market because of the “significant cost that 
would be incurred to terminate the Management Agreement”). 
 82 See Corwin, 125 A.3d at 306. The LLC agreement parroted corporate management by provid-
ing for governance by an elected board of directors. See id.at 307 (stating that the members of the 
LLC knew that the company would be managed by a board of directors). 
 83 See id. at 306 n.3 (acknowledging that the parties decided to act as if its entities were gov-
erned by corporate law rather than the law governing LLCs and partnerships). 
 84 Id. at 306. 
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controlling owner based solely upon a contract delegating day-to-day man-
agement to an affiliate of that party.85 
On appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, the plaintiffs decided to push 
an alternate theory. They argued that if the fairness test did not apply, the case 
called for heightened scrutiny under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc.86 One problem, however, is that it is uncertain whether the 
merger triggered Revlon even if one applies such corporate law doctrines to 
LLCs. The merger was an equity exchange involving two publicly traded en-
tities—albeit, a general partner, rather than an elected board, controlled the 
limited partnership.87 In the end, however, the Delaware Supreme Court de-
cided to ignore the issue of whether Revlon applied, as well as whether the 
plaintiffs sprang their Revlon argument too late to consider. Instead, the court 
held that the business judgment rule governed even if the transaction fell 
within Revlon.88 
The court gave essentially two reasons for this. The principal reason, 
which goes to this Article, is the impact of shareholder approval. The court 
held that an informed and uncoerced shareholder approval triggers the busi-
ness judgment rule based both upon statements in prior court decisions89 as 
well as policy grounds for deferring to the shareholders.90 The court also re-
jected the plaintiffs’ argument that Gantler v. Stephens precluded shareholder 
votes from impacting the standard of review when the votes occur in the re-
quired approval for a merger or sale. Instead, the court explained that Gantler 
was only addressing terminology and not the actual impact of shareholder 
approval.91 
                                                                                                                           
 85 Id. at 307–08. 
 86 Id. at 308; Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1986). 
 87 See Corwin, 125 A.3d at 308 n.12. 
 88 See id. at 308 (stating that regardless of whether the Revlon standard should otherwise be 
applied, the uncoerced and informed shareholder vote leads the court to apply the business judgment 
rule). 
 89 See id. at 309 n.14 (referring to the Chancery Court’s adherence to precedent in applying the 
business judgment rule when a transaction is approved by a fully informed and uncoerced vote of 
disinterested shareholders); id. at 309 n.19 (citing numerous judicial decisions that propose that “the 
approval of the disinterested stockholders in a fully informed, uncoerced vote that was required to 
consummate a transaction has the effect of invoking the business judgment rule”); id. at 313 n.28 
(citing Delaware precedent suggesting that the courts should avoid interfering with the decisions of 
disinterested shareholders). 
 90 See id. at 313 (stating that judges should refrain from imposing their own judgment in place 
of the owners or managers of corporations). 
 91 See id. at 309–11 (reasoning that the Gantler court likely did not intend to unsettle long-
standing precedent that gives the informed shareholder vote effect in determining the standard of 
review, regardless of whether the transaction required shareholder approval, and instead intended 
to narrow the meaning of the word “ratification”); Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
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A second reason for its decision dribbled out in response to the plaintiffs’ 
argument that invoking the business judgment rule based upon shareholder 
approval would impair the operation of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 
and Revlon and leave shareholders unprotected from unfair actions by direc-
tors. In part, the court responded with the reassurance that the shareholders 
must be informed and not coerced in order to trigger the business judgment 
rule.92 In part, the court once again pointed to the shareholders’ economic 
stake in the transaction as vouching for their ability to protect themselves 
through a vote, as well as the problems generated by litigating over mergers.93 
Before making these arguments, however, the court observed that Unocal and 
Revlon were primarily designed for actions seeking injunctions rather than 
actions for damages.94 
Interestingly, the court failed to pursue this observation as far as it could 
go. The defendants pointed out that the LLC was governed by a provision in 
the operating agreement that exculpated the LLC’s directors from liability.95 
Furthermore, the Delaware Supreme Court had previously held that such pro-
visions trump heightened scrutiny under Revlon when it comes to damage 
claims.96 Hence, the whole discussion about the impact of shareholder ap-
proval was unnecessary to decide the case. 
B. Problems Following Corwin 
Every important judicial decision leaves some chaos in its wake. Corwin 
is no exception. The potential problems created or exposed by Corwin flow 
both from the prerequisites it sets forth in order for a shareholder vote to 
lessen judicial scrutiny and from the various ways in which this lessening of 
scrutiny might interact with the layer cake of standards applied by Delaware 
courts in reviewing decisions to merge or sell a corporation. 
1. Problems from Corwin’s Prerequisites 
The predicable impact of Corwin is to shift the focus in litigation chal-
lenging an independent board’s decision to merge or sell the corporation from 
the process and substance of the board’s decision to the twin prerequisites for 
triggering favorable treatment based upon a shareholder vote: (1) whether the 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312 (affirming that the business judgment rule would not apply 
where troubling facts are not disclosed to the shareholders or where shareholders are coerced into 
approving a transaction). 
 93 Id. at 312–14. 
 94 Id. at 312. The plaintiffs in Corwin did not seek to enjoin the merger before closing, but 
rather sought post-closing money damages. In re KKR Fin. Holdings, 101 A.3d at 989. 
 95 See Corwin, 125 A.3d at 308. 
 96 See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 239–40 (Del. 2009) (stating that in situations 
in which the corporation’s certificate of incorporation contains an exculpatory provision, the court 
will not apply heightened scrutiny to allegations that the directors breached their duty of care). 
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shareholders were fully informed; and (2) whether the shareholders were un-
coerced. The first prerequisite has produced an unintended side effect, 
whereas the second has exposed the failure of Delaware courts to resolve a 
critical question. 
a. Uncovering Corwin’s Impact on Disclosure Litigation 
Claims that directors failed to adequately inform the shareholders when 
seeking approval for mergers and sales long predate Corwin and invoke well-
established state and federal law.97 Nevertheless, insofar as Corwin makes it 
significantly more difficult to challenge the decision to enter the deal in the 
face of a fully informed shareholder vote of approval, Corwin gives greater 
impetus to challenging the disclosure received by the shareholders.98 Indeed, 
non-disclosure claims have already provided tempting examples of plaintiff 
success in the post-Corwin world. 
A pair of recent Delaware Supreme Court decisions—Appel v. Berkman 
and Morrison v. Berry—shows this to be the case. Coincidentally, both in-
volved sales to the same private equity buyer.99 The parties structured the 
transactions as board-supported tender offers followed by mergers to remove 
the non-tendering shareholders at the same price as the tender offers.100 Un-
der Section 251(h) of Delaware’s corporation statute,101 this turned ac-
                                                                                                                           
 97 See, e.g., Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1276 (Del. 1994) (discuss-
ing shareholder-plaintiffs’ claims that the directors violated their fiduciary duty by failing to fully 
disclose material information); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: A Corporate 
Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1093–98 (1996) (discussing claims 
under Delaware law against directors for non-disclosure to shareholders). Rules promulgated pur-
suant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibit the inclusion of false or misleading statements 
in proxy statements. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2010) (prohibiting false or misleading proxy solic-
itations); see also Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1095–98 (1991) (addressing 
elements of a private cause of action to claim a violation of Rule 14a-9 through misleading solici-
tation of shareholder proxies in favor of a merger).  
 98 Corwin might also tempt plaintiffs to delay pushing non-disclosure claims until after the 
shareholders vote, rather than to seek corrective disclosure before the vote. In this manner, plaintiffs 
might try to use such claims to avoid the business judgment rule when seeking damages. See Bran-
don Mordue, The Revlon Divergence: The Evolution of Judicial Review of Merger Litigation, 12 
VA. L. & BUS. REV. 531, 563–66 (2018) (discussing the incentive created by the Corwin decision 
to bring non-disclosure claims after closing). 
 99 In both cases, Apollo Global Management LLC was the private equity firm seeking to acquire 
the different corporations. Morrison v. Berry, 191 A.3d 268, 274–73 (Del. 2018); Appel v. Berkman, 
180 A.3d 1055, 1057 (Del. 2018). 
 100 Morrison, 191 A.33d at 272–73; Appel, 180 A.3d at 1057. 
 101 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(h) (West 2011 & Supp. 2018) (permitting a target corporation 
to forgo a shareholder vote in favor of a merger that gives the holdout shareholders of the target the 
same consideration paid to the shareholders accepting a tender offer). For this to occur, the target’s 
board must support the tender offer and a majority of the target’s shareholders must accept the offer. 
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ceptance of the tender offers by a majority of the target corporations’ share-
holders into de facto shareholder votes to approve the mergers.102 In both 
cases, the plaintiffs complained about failures to disclose material facts in the 
Schedule 14D-9 statements filed by the targets’ boards recommending the 
shareholders accept the offers.103 Completing the parallel between the cases, 
the non-disclosed facts in both cases involved the positions of the target com-
panies’ founders regarding the deal.104 
Here, however, the parallel stops. In Appel, the board’s 14D-9 statement 
mentioned that the company’s founder and former CEO, who still served as 
chairman of the board, had abstained on the board’s vote to recommend the 
deal and had not decided whether to tender his own stock.105 What the state-
ment neglected to point out, however, is that this individual twice stated to 
the board that he was abstaining because he believed mismanagement had 
lowered the purchase price and it was not the right time to sell the com-
pany.106 In Morrison, by contrast, the target company’s founder, who also 
owned ten percent of the company’s shares, favored the deal and had agreed 
to roll over his stock, thereby placing him on the buyer’s side and in a conflict 
of interest.107 Although the 14D-9 statement disclosed the rollover, it failed 
to disclose how early in the process the founder had agreed to the rollover 
with the buyer or that the founder had misled the board about this timing, 
thereby blinding the board to the conflict during its early deliberations.108 
Moreover, the 14D-9 statement was misleading in suggesting that the founder 
was more open to competing offers than he, in fact, was.109 There were also 
failures to disclose, or misleading statements regarding, the founder’s desire 
                                                                                                                           
 102 See In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 741–47 (Del. Ch. 2016) (treating 
the acceptance by a majority of the target’s shareholders of a tender offer that fit within § 251(h) as 
the equivalent of a shareholder approval for purposes of Corwin). 
 103 The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) permits communications by the board 
of the target corporation to its shareholders in response to a tender offer as long as it is provided in 
the form specified by the SEC in Schedule 14D-9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (2008). 
 104 See Morrison, 191 A.3d at 274 (discussing the plaintiff’s allegations that the founder did not 
fully disclose his pre-established connections with the buyer); Appel, 180 A.3d at 1057 (stating that 
the shareholder proxy statement did not include the fact that the founder did not support the sale of 
the corporation). 
 105 Appel, 180 A.3d at 1058–59. 
 106 Id. 
 107 See Morrison, 191 A.3d at 274 (noting that the founder continued to be a substantial share-
holder in the corporation, thereby incentivizing him to make payments to the other shareholders at 
a lower price).  
 108 See id. at 277–80 (stating that the founders, in their e-mail to the board of directors on No-
vember 28, did not disclose the fact that they had entered into an agreement with the buyer as early 
as October). 
 109 See id. at 280–81 (noting that by omitting language in its statement to the shareholders, the 
founders exaggerated their willingness to consider offers from competing buyers). 
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for an immediate sale and the reasons for the board appointing a special com-
mittee to approve the sale.110 Reversing contrary decisions by the Chancery 
Court, the Delaware Supreme Court in both cases found the non-disclosures 
to be material. Accordingly, the shareholders’ acceptance of the tender offers 
did not lower the standard to the business judgment rule under Corwin and 
did not warrant dismissal of the complaints.111  
So far, this seems to show that Corwin is operating as intended: giving 
weight to the decisions of fully informed shareholders but refusing to allow 
shareholder approval to serve as a “get out of jail free card” for directors who 
are less than candid with their shareholders. The problem is that this runs into 
another development in Delaware mergers and acquisition litigation: the 
growing skepticism about whether litigation over disclosure to shareholders 
benefits the shareholders. 
This skepticism has found expression in both court opinions and schol-
arly commentary.112 In In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, the Delaware 
Chancery Court refused to approve a settlement agreement releasing all of 
the plaintiffs’ shareholder class action claims in exchange for the corpora-
tion’s additional disclosures to its shareholders prior to them voting to ap-
prove the proposed merger.113 
The court worried that settlements that only call upon the corporation to 
make additional disclosure to the shareholders (“disclosure-only settle-
ments”), such as the one before the court, can do little for the shareholders, 
but can allow the plaintiffs’ attorneys to collect fees based upon this so-called 
success.114 This can encourage unscrupulous plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring ac-
tions challenging every merger, knowing that it is often more economical for 
the corporation to agree to additional disclosure than to litigate the merits.115 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See id. at 284–88 (discussing the various omissions and misleading statements by the com-
pany’s founder to both the rest of the board and shareholders and holding that they were material). 
 111 Id.; Appel, 180 A.3d at 1064–65. 
 112 See infra notes 113–122 and accompanying text. 
 113 129 A.3d 884, 907 (Del. Ch. 2016). The settlement agreement was made pursuant to an 
earlier memorandum of understanding between the parties. Id. at 889–90.  
 114 See id. at 891–92. Delaware, like other jurisdictions, holds that the plaintiff’s attorney in a 
class action, who obtains a substantial benefit (even if not monetary damages) for a class, is entitled 
to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees. See Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 
1164–65 (Del. 1988) (discussing court-ordered payment of attorney’s fees in light of counsel con-
ferring a corporate benefit). See generally Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to 
Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 19–25 (2015) (dis-
cussing the judiciary’s role in determining whether the plaintiffs’ attorneys conferred a corporate 
benefit to the shareholders). 
 115 See Trulia, 129 A.3d at 892 (observing that corporations would rather settle to lessen legal 
expenses and potential distractions rather than litigate with shareholders over disclosure require-
ments). 
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Moreover, such settlements can entice plaintiffs’ attorneys to throw away 
meritorious challenges to poor mergers in order to get quick payoffs through 
disclosure-only settlements.116 
Yet, despite its seemingly desirable corrective, Trulia might be in ten-
sion with Corwin. After all, if the essence of Corwin is that fully informed 
shareholders should decide if a merger or sale is a good deal, then there is 
nothing wrong with litigation focusing on whether the shareholders were 
fully informed. Moreover, if the focus of the challenge is on the failure to 
disclose, then there is nothing wrong with a settlement solely involving ad-
ditional disclosure. Of course, read narrowly, Trulia is not inconsistent with 
this view, because the court was concerned with disclosure-only settlements 
that failed to force disclosure of material or even helpful information to the 
shareholders.117 
Some scholars, however, have gone further in broadly condemning dis-
closure-only settlements.118 Others, led by Jill Fisch, Sean Griffith, and Ste-
ven Davidoff Solomon, even more broadly condemn state law merger litiga-
tion that focuses on disclosure to the shareholders.119 
Fisch, Griffith, and Solomon present a study comparing the margins 
(typically overwhelming) by which shareholders voted to approve mergers in 
the sample of cases the authors collected against the presence or absence of 
various factors.120 Recommendations from the principal shareholder advisory 
service and the premium that the merger price represents over the existing 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See, e.g., Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposes the Systemic Problem of Disclo-
sure Settlements, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877, 904 (2015) (discussing a case in which a disclosure-only 
settlement generating $475,000 in legal fees was nearly finalized before new counsel obtained par-
tial settlements paying shareholders $11.6 million). 
 117 See Trulia, 129 A.3d at 904–07 (rejecting the settlement agreement because the disclosures 
given to the shareholders as consideration were neither material nor helpful). 
 118 See, e.g., Browning Jeffries, The Plaintiffs’ Lawyer’s Transaction Tax: The New Cost of 
Doing Business in Public Company Deals, 11 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 59, 89 (2014) (alleging that 
disclosure-only settlements harm shareholders by requiring them to release all future claims, reduc-
ing the monetary benefit that they would have received from the transaction, and shifting control of 
the settlement to their attorneys); Mark Lebovitch & Jeroen Van Kwawegen, Of Babies and Bath-
water: Deterring Frivolous Stockholder Suits Without Closing the Courthouse Doors to Legitimate 
Claims, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 537–39 (2016) (arguing that disclosure-only settlements should 
be brought only after plaintiffs show that the disclosures would provide material benefits and the 
release of claims should be limited to additional disclosures, rather than a broader release of all 
claims). 
 119 See Peppercorn Settlement, supra note 10, at 615 (arguing for the elimination of disclosure-
only settlements). 
 120 See generally id. at 577–82 (providing the method and results of a study of merger settle-
ments and shareholder voting). 
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market price appear to impact the margin by which shareholders vote to ap-
prove the merger.121 To a lesser extent, settlements of shareholder litigation, 
which produce either improved price or other amendments to the terms of the 
merger agreement, also appear to impact the vote. The study, however, found 
no difference in the margin of victory in situations involving corrective dis-
closure of negative information—which should have discouraged some 
shareholders from voting in favor—when compared to mergers for which 
there was no corrective disclosure.122 
This result raises the question as to why corrective disclosures do not 
seem to have any noticeable impact on shareholder votes to approve mergers. 
One answer, consistent with the holdings in Trulia, is that in many cases the 
corrective disclosures involve unimportant facts.123 Yet in other cases, such 
as Appel and Morrison, the shareholders ignore facts that logic would deem 
highly relevant.124 If so, this might raise the question of whether informed 
shareholders are the ideal decisionmakers that Corwin assumes them to be. 
We shall return to explore these questions later in this Article. For now, 
it is sufficient to note that, based upon the result of their study, Fisch, Griffith, 
and Solomon conclude that state court litigation challenging disclosure to the 
shareholders does little good for the shareholders.125 Accordingly, they rec-
ommend elimination of disclosure-only settlements as a means to more 
                                                                                                                           
 121 Institutional Investment Services, Inc. (ISS) is a principal shareholder advisory service that 
provides advice to its institutional investor clients, including on how to vote on mergers. About Us, 
ISS, https://www.issgovernance.com/about/about-iss/ [https://perma.cc/RRT2-QV9B]. 
 122 Peppercorn Settlement, supra note 10, at 583–87. One problem with this comparison, how-
ever, is the assumption that mergers with corrective disclosure should have a lesser margin of vic-
tory than mergers without such disclosure. If the corporations that did not make corrective disclosure 
had originally disclosed all the negative facts about the deal without the prompting of litigation 
(because they had more honest directors rather than less negative facts), the study’s hypothesis as 
to the expected impact of corrective disclosure would not be true. Moreover, it is possible that the 
reassurance, which additional disclosures provide to shareholders that they have seen the worst of 
it as far as hidden information, might offset the impact of additional negative disclosure on share-
holder voting decisions. In any event, the overwhelming amount of votes of approval even after 
corrective disclosure makes it clear that the corrective disclosures in the sample could not have lost 
that many votes. 
 123 See Trulia, 129 A.3d at 907 (holding that directors’ disclosures were immaterial to share-
holders’ decision on whether to approve a transaction). 
 124 See Morrison, 191 A.3d at 284–88 (holding that omitted disclosures were material to share-
holders); Appel, 180 A.3d at 1064–65 (holding that by omitting the chairman’s concerns from share-
holder disclosure, the board withheld material information, and therefore, the shareholders were not 
fully informed). 
 125 See Peppercorn Settlement, supra note 10, at 591 (concluding that because disclosure-only 
settlements do not affect shareholder voting on mergers, they “do not provide shareholders with 
useful information”). 
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broadly curtail state court litigation over disclosure.126 If one accepts this con-
clusion, then Corwin’s impact of channeling even more litigation into arguing 
about disclosure seems highly problematic.  
b. Forcing the Determination of Coercion 
Despite not impacting as many cases as non-disclosure claims, argu-
ments that the shareholders were coerced can also provide an avenue for 
plaintiff success in the post-Corwin world. The Delaware Chancery Court’s 
decision in In re Saba Software, Inc. Stockholder Litigation shows this to be 
the case.127 
Saba Software was a Delaware corporation whose stock traded over the 
counter after being delisted by NASDAQ in 2013.128 Things went further 
downhill when, the next year, the SEC accused the company of having in-
flated reported earnings for 2007 through 2011 by seventy million dollars.129 
The company agreed to pay a fine and to restate its financial results for those 
years.130 It did the former but, despite repeated promises, did not do the latter. 
With the company repeatedly missing public commitments to issue restated 
earnings reports and its stock price falling from $14 to $8.75, Saba Software’s 
board embarked upon an effort to sell the company.131 This produced a mer-
ger agreement under which the shareholders received $9 per share.132 The 
merger received a favorable vote from the shareholders. Critically, the vote 
occurred shortly after the company missed its final deadline from the SEC 
for restating its earnings and the SEC deregistered the company’s stock, ren-
dering it not publicly tradable.133 
                                                                                                                           
 126 Id. at 615. 
 127 See No. 10697-VCS, 2017 WL 1201108, at *16–17 (Del. Ch. Feb. 17, 2017) (applying 
enhanced scrutiny when reviewing a merger under the Revlon standard because the directors coerced 
the shareholders into approving the transaction). A second case in which claims of coercion allowed 
a plaintiff to get past Corwin—only to fail in his effort to establish that the underlying transaction 
implicated the directors’ duty of loyalty—is Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp., No. 11418-
VCG, 2017 WL 2352152, at *23–24 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2017). The claimed coercion arose when 
the directors made the favorable corporate combinations submitted to the shareholders for approval 
dependent on financing to be accomplished by issuing stock to an allegedly controlling shareholder. 
In this instance, however, the claim was not that the shareholders were coerced into voting for the 
combinations. Rather, the contention was that the shareholders were coerced into voting for the 
financing in order to get the favorable combinations. Id.  
 128 Saba Software, 2017 WL 1201108, at *2. 
 129 Id. at *3. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at *6. 
 133 Id. at *2–6. 
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Responding to a lawsuit alleging the directors breached their fiduciary 
duty in agreeing to the merger, the Delaware Chancery Court refused to in-
voke Corwin despite the favorable vote of Saba Software’s shareholders. In 
part, this was because of the company’s failure to disclose certain facts to the 
shareholders, such as why those in charge of the company could not manage 
to issue a statement of what the company actually earned from 2007 through 
2011.134 Of relevance to the present discussion, the court also concluded that 
the shareholders were coerced by the predicament in which, if they voted 
down the merger, they would be left with stock they could not publicly sell.135 
As with the non-disclosure claims in Appel and Morrison, at first glance 
the court’s reaction to the coercion claim in Saba Software shows Corwin 
working as intended: giving weight to the decision of shareholders, but not 
when the directors forced the decision with arm-twisting. The problem in this 
instance lies in the difficulty of deciding what is coercion. 
Saba Software illustrates the problem. At first glance, the case for coer-
cion seems easy. Saba Software’s shareholders were in a situation in which 
if they did not vote for the merger, they would be stuck with stock barred 
from public trading. On the other hand, this is ultimately no different than 
any other merger by a flailing company attempting to salvage something for 
its shareholders. True, illegal actions by former executives and the current 
management’s inability to correct the problem caused the trouble for Saba 
Software. Yet, does this mean there is coercion any time management pro-
poses a merger to salvage the wreck created by its mismanagement and illegal 
                                                                                                                           
 134 Id. at *11–12. 
 135 Id. at *14–16. The Chancery Court’s recent decision in In re Tangoe, Inc. Shareholders 
Litigation is somewhat similar. No. 2017-0650-JRS, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 2018). Like Saba 
Software, Tangoe, Inc. was forced to restate false financial statements that resulted in its stock being 
delisted and threatened with deregistration. Id. Tangoe’s board also agreed to sell the company while 
working on restating earnings. Id. at *2. Continuing the parallel, the Chancery Court in Tangoe 
refused to dismiss a suit against Tangoe’s directors based upon the effect under Corwin of the share-
holders’ approving the sale. Id. at *9. Once again, the court found inadequate disclosure to the 
shareholders. In Tangoe, however, the court decided it was unnecessary to address coercion. None-
theless, the court stated that the analysis regarding coercion would likely repeat Saba Software. Id. 
at *11–12. The combined impact of Saba Software and Tangoe is to raise the question as to whether 
corporations can ever be sold while in the middle of restating their earnings to a major degree. 
Tangoe suggests that the failure to disclose accurate financials is a material non-disclosure, whereas 
both cases suggest that the threat of delisting or deregistration is coercion. Although Tangoe closes 
with a paragraph reassuring that a sale is possible with sufficiently careful disclosure, the court does 
not explain how the directors can disclose accurate financials before the accountants figure out how 
to restate the financials. Moreover, without the restatement, the threat of delisting and deregistration 
hangs over the shareholder vote. Of course, one might say that this simply leaves the directors to 
face heightened scrutiny under Revlon. This ignores, however, the prospect that an uninformed or 
coerced shareholder vote might not meet the statutory requirement for shareholder approval. 
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activities? If so, does this mean that shareholders are supposed to go down 
with the ship? 
To state the obvious, one must define coercion before deciding whether 
there is coercion. Saba Software recites the definition established by the Del-
aware Supreme Court in Williams v. Geier.136 There, the court defined coer-
cion as an action by the board or some other party that causes shareholders 
to vote in favor of a proposed transaction for some reason other than the mer-
its of the transaction.137 Despite sounding sensible, this definition is often 
impossible to apply. 
Saba Software shows the difficulty. The court implicitly treats the “reg-
ulatory chaos” in which the company found itself as extrinsic to the merits of 
selling at $9 per share.138 This assumes, however, that one can separate the 
company’s legal problems from the merits of cheaply selling a company in 
trouble with the law. In order to achieve this separation, the court accepted 
the plaintiffs’ theory that the directors should have put the company’s legal 
affairs in order prior to selling the company or, at least, prior to putting the 
matter to the shareholders.139 Yet, there is no suggestion that the directors 
were stalling the earnings restatements in order to force the shareholders to 
approve the sale. Rather, it seems that the company’s financial records were 
so thoroughly messed up that forensic accounting had yet to figure out the 
actual earnings.140 
Turning to Williams for guidance is no more helpful because the court 
there never applied the test it announced. Williams involved a shareholder-
approved amendment to the company’s certificate of incorporation that gave 
more votes per share to stock not sold within a three-year period.141 A dis-
senting shareholder challenged this amendment, arguing that the minority 
shareholders were coerced into voting for it. The claimed coercion arose from 
the fact that the NYSE would delist the company’s stock if the amendment 
passed only by a majority vote, but might not delist the stock if the amend-
ment passed by a two-thirds vote.142 Under these circumstances, minority 
                                                                                                                           
 136 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996). 
 137 Id. at 1382–83. 
 138 See Saba Software, 2017 WL 1201108, at *15–16. 
 139 See id. (stating that the board was “hellbent” on selling before issuing restatements). 
 140 The cynic might suspect that the real motive was that the earnings were even worse than 
outsiders assumed. In that case, however, restating the earnings would further undercut the merger 
price, which hardly helps the shareholders. 
 141 See Williams, 671 A.2d at 1373 (reciting the explanation in the proxy statement that the 
amendment was intended to provide, among other things, “existing and long-term shareholders with 
a greater voice in the company”).  
 142 Id. at 1382. 
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shareholders who disfavored the amendment might vote for it anyway be-
cause the majority’s support assured that it was going to pass and the minority 
shareholders’ approval might prevent delisting. 
Although the threat of delisting in Williams seems somewhat tangential 
to the merits of altering voting power, the Williams court did not hold that 
there was coercion.143 Curiously, instead of discussing whether the listing 
problem was part of the merits of the amendment, the court in Williams fo-
cused most of its attention on pointing out that the board had little choice but 
to disclose the delisting danger and the prospect that a two-thirds vote would 
prevent delisting under a proposed change in the NYSE rule.144 Furthermore, 
the court noted that the board did not use threatening language when pointing 
out these facts.145 The court also stated that it would be unacceptable to pre-
clude an amendment altogether because of the need to disclose the impact of 
the NYSE rule and proposed rule change.146 
Implicitly recognizing that the Williams court did not apply the other-
than-the-merits test, the court in Saba Software explained that coercion 
hinges upon what the court holds to be inequitable.147 This allows one to rec-
oncile Williams and Saba Software by noting that the arguably coercive im-
pact of the NYSE rule and proposed rule change was not something the di-
rectors in Williams deliberately created or could do anything about. This dif-
fers from Saba Software, where the company’s legal problems resulted from 
management misdeeds and the board could have deferred selling the com-
pany until it sorted out the mess. The problem is that the relevance of the 
coercion in Saba Software dictated the level of scrutiny the court applied to 
the board’s refusal to delay selling the company until the company complied 
with the law. Under Corwin, if there is no coercion (or non-disclosure), the 
court should apply the business judgment rule to this timing decision. Hence, 
second-guessing the board’s timing in order to disregard the shareholder vote 
that would preclude the court from second-guessing the timing decision 
                                                                                                                           
 143 Id. at 1384. 
 144 See id. at 1382–84 (describing the disclosures as facts that were required to be disclosed and 
facts that a reasonable shareholder would want to know). 
 145 Id. at 1383. 
 146 Id. at 1383–84. The plaintiff in Williams brought this rejoinder upon herself by arguing that 
the shareholder vote was null and void due to the coercion. She should have argued that the share-
holder vote was insufficient to change the standard to the business judgment rule when just the 
minority was coerced.  
 147 Saba Software, 2017 WL 1201108, at *15. This makes coercion somewhat like Justice Potter 
Stewart’s “I know it when I see it” take on the meaning of “pornography.” See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Potter, J., concurring) (remarking on how one defines hard-core pornog-
raphy). 
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seems to be an application of bootstrap logic. This illustrates the danger of 
turning coercion into a license for the court to consider whatever it wants.148 
2. Corwin’s Messy Impact on the Judicial Scrutiny Layer Cake 
Corwin also invites a host of questions regarding how it relates to the 
various standards Delaware has established for reviewing board decisions to 
merge or sell corporations. Some of these questions result from omissions or 
sloppy language in Corwin, whereas some of the questions are more funda-
mental. 
a. Corwin, the Business Judgment Rule, and Good Faith Standards: How 
Low Can You Go? 
Corwin states that shareholder approval returns review from heightened 
scrutiny to the business judgment rule.149 Accordingly, one might assume that 
Corwin is simply irrelevant to a case in which the applicable standard is al-
ready at the business judgment rule. This should even be more true for a case 
in which plaintiffs must prove a lack of good faith, rather than just gross neg-
ligence, in order to overcome a Section 102(b)(7) waiver. Nevertheless, sub-
sequent Delaware court decisions have suggested that, as a result of Corwin, 
shareholder approval further lowers the standard, even in cases in which the 
standard is low to start with. 
In In re MeadWestvaco Stockholders Litigation, the Delaware Chancery 
Court left open the impact of Corwin on cases governed by a Section 
102(b)(7) waiver.150 Specifically, the court stated that the plaintiff’s failure to 
present facts that showed a lack of good faith made it unnecessary to address 
the defendants’ argument that shareholder approval cleanses a claim that di-
rectors did not act in good faith.151 
In Singh v. Attenborough, however, the Delaware Supreme Court did not 
exhibit a similar reticence toward unnecessary discourse when affirming a 
Chancery Court decision that held the plaintiff had not established gross neg-
ligence in order to get past the business judgment rule. Instead, the Delaware 
Supreme Court observed that applying a gross negligence standard in the face 
                                                                                                                           
 148 One might respond that applying the business judgment rule to the timing decision in order 
to respect the shareholder vote that triggers the business judgment rule is also bootstrap reasoning. 
This is why it would be helpful to have a definition of coercion that is independent of what the court 
thinks of the merits of the board’s decision that creates pressure on the shareholders to vote for the 
deal. 
 149 Corwin, 125 A.3d at 313–14. 
 150 168 A.3d 675, 684 (Del. Ch. 2017). 
 151 Id. 
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of shareholder approval in a situation already falling within the business judg-
ment rule would mean that shareholder approval had no impact on the stand-
ard of review.152 Disturbed by this prospect, the Delaware Supreme Court 
stated that courts should not apply the gross negligence standard in such sit-
uations, but instead should normally dismiss the case.153 
Singh’s dictum returns to an issue that dates at least to Smith v. Van 
Gorkom. In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court held directors to be 
grossly negligent in approving a merger based upon a twenty-minute oral 
presentation.154 The directors argued, among other things, that the share-
holder vote to approve the merger exonerated them.155 The court responded 
that, because the directors’ breach of duty constituted a voidable act, an in-
formed vote by the shareholders to approve the merger would have freed the 
directors from liability.156 Nevertheless, the directors’ failure to disclose to 
the shareholders the board’s careless process meant that there was not an in-
formed vote by the shareholders.157 
Over the years, this discussion in Van Gorkom has remained largely the-
oretical for the simple reason that directors are unlikely to inform their share-
holders how careless they were in agreeing to a merger. In addition, the Del-
aware Supreme Court in the Gantler decision expressly overruled this lan-
guage in Van Gorkom, explaining that ratification of voidable acts only refers 
to acts for which directors lack authority.158 It remains to be seen whether 
Singh’s resurrection of Van Gorkom’s outcome, even if not its language, will 
lead future directors to argue that they provided sufficient disclosure to the 
shareholders of careless process in order for shareholder approval to preclude 
any claim for carelessness. Of course, this might be awkward if the directors 
also deny their process was careless. If directors start arguing that they dis-
closed careless process to the shareholders sufficiently for the shareholder 
vote to insulate them from claims based upon sloppiness, then the conse-
quence of Singh might become a subset of Corwin’s channeling more litiga-
tion into disputes about disclosure. Specifically, instead of disputes over 
whether the directors’ carelessness was sufficiently egregious to create liabil-
ity, the focus will turn to whether directors were sufficiently candid in con-
fessing all of their failures of process to their shareholders. 
                                                                                                                           
 152 Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 151–52 (Del. 2016). 
 153 See id. at 151–52 (stating that when “the business judgment rule standard of review is in-
voked because of a vote, dismissal is typically the result”). 
 154 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985). 
 155 See id. at 873–74, 889 (directors arguing that they were informed in making their decision 
to approve the merger, but “ultimately rely[ing] on the stockholder vote . . . for exoneration”). 
 156 Id. at 889. 
 157 Id. at 889–91. 
 158 Gantler, 965 A.2d at 713 n.54. 
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Instead of talking about grossly negligent process of investigation and 
deliberation in deciding upon a merger,159 the court in Singh elaborated on 
the rationale for its approach by attacking the waste standard.160 As explained 
earlier, waste is the standard courts commonly apply when reviewing trans-
actions approved by the shareholders.161 Waste, however, is not concerned 
with grossly negligent process, but rather with the merits of the board’s deci-
sion.162 Specifically, to constitute waste, an action must be so egregiously 
stupid that no reasonable person would think that the corporation or its share-
holders received the equivalent to what the corporation or its shareholders 
gave up.163 
In questioning the possibility of waste when shareholders approve a 
transaction, Singh relies on the logic that a shareholder vote of approval re-
buts the notion that no reasonable person would have thought the corporation 
or shareholders received the equivalent to what they gave up in the deal. Of 
course, one might say the same about a vote by a disinterested board. Perhaps 
in either event the bottom line is that waste claims have no more basis in 
reality than the Loch Ness Monster.164 Before dismissing the whole notion of 
waste as a myth, however, one should be aware of cases in relatively recent 
years in which Delaware courts have upheld claims that transactions 
amounted to waste.165 
                                                                                                                           
 159 See In re Zale Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 9388-VCP, 2015 WL 6551418, *5 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 29, 2015) (holding that the directors did not act with gross negligence in their process of de-
ciding to enter into the merger agreement). 
 160 See Singh, 137 A.3d at 152 (supporting the argument that courts should dismiss claims of 
gross negligence in the face of shareholder approval because the waste standard triggered by share-
holder approval has “little real-world relevance”). 
 161 See supra note 61 (discussing corporate waste standard). 
 162 See Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 893 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating that a 
waste claim depends on whether the “economics of the transaction were so flawed” that no ordinary 
business person would approve of it, rather than whether the board’s process in approving the trans-
action was flawed).  
 163 E.g., Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 59 (Del. 1952) (stating that corporate 
waste occurs when “no person of ordinarily sound business judgment would be expected to entertain 
the view that the consideration furnished by the individual directors is a fair exchange for the options 
conferred”). 
 164 See Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 18, 1995) (com-
paring the likelihood of a plaintiff’s complaint meeting the legal standard of waste to the existence 
of Nessie, the Loch Ness Monster). 
 165 E.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 138 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
(holding that providing a departing CEO who was allegedly responsible for the company’s massive 
financial loss with a $68 million reward as well as an office, administrative assistant, and car with 
a driver could constitute waste). For a more complete discussion of the emergence and survival of 
the corporate waste doctrine, see Harwell Wells, The Life (and Death?) of Corporate Waste, 74 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1239 (2017). 
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In any event, Singh’s statement that complaints already subject to the 
business judgment rule should be dismissed if the shareholders approved the 
challenged transaction, without mentioning the issue of good faith, creates an 
anomaly. Section 102(b)(7) does not allow shareholders to exculpate director 
actions that are not in good faith.166 One might think that what shareholders 
cannot do ex ante, they should not be able to do ex post. 
One might try to deal with this anomaly by saying that Singh eliminates 
the prospects for waste claims but preserves the possibility for lack of good 
faith claims. This argument also reconciles Singh and MeadWestvaco. The 
problem, however, is that the Delaware Chancery Court in MeadWestvaco 
suggested waste and good faith might end up at the same place. Specifically, 
the court explained that to constitute waste, an action must be so egregiously 
stupid that the directors could not have subjectively believed that the trans-
action was in the best interest of the corporation or its shareholders and so 
acted in bad faith.167 
b. Corwin and Revlon: Two Foundations Make Up a Conundrum 
The Delaware Supreme Court in Corwin used its ruling regarding the 
impact of shareholder approval as a reason to reject applying heightened scru-
tiny under Revlon.168 In the middle of invoking the impact of shareholder 
approval, however, the court observed that Revlon is really a doctrine de-
signed to govern actions seeking injunctions rather than, as in the case at 
hand, actions for damages.169 Unfortunately, Corwin once again proves that 
from the standpoint of judicial clarity, two rationales offered for the same 
conclusion is often one too many. The problem in this instance is that the 
combination of these two rationales for rejecting Revlon scrutiny creates a 
conundrum. 
                                                                                                                           
 166 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2011 & Supp. 2018) (disallowing a limiting 
liability provision for directors’ “acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional 
misconduct or a knowing violation of law”). 
 167 See In re MeadWestvaco Stockholders Litig., 168 A.3d at 686 (equating the test of whether 
directors acted in bad faith with that of whether they committed waste, thereby collapsing the test 
for corporate waste with that of bad faith) (citing White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 n.36 (Del. 
2001)). 
 168 See Corwin, 125 A.3d at 308 (stating that approval of the transaction by a fully informed 
and uncoerced shareholder vote made the Revlon standard inapplicable). 
 169 See id. at 312 (stating that Unocal and Revlon are “primarily designed to give stockholders 
and the Chancery Court the tool of injunctive relief”). Just to keep everyone guessing, however, the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis affirmed the 
Chancery Court’s application of Revlon in a decision seeking damages—albeit, the damages in-
volved an award against investment bankers for aiding and abetting the directors’ breach of duty 
instead of an award of damages against the directors. 129 A.3d 816, 857 (Del. 2015). 
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In stating that Revlon is designed for actions seeking injunctions rather 
than damages, Corwin appears to suggest that courts should continue to apply 
Revlon’s heightened scrutiny in situations otherwise triggering the doctrine 
when the remedy sought is an injunction against proceeding with the deal as 
is. Besides, because mergers generally close shortly upon a favorable share-
holder vote, there typically would not yet be a shareholder vote to trigger 
Corwin at the time the court decides upon issuing an injunction to block the 
merger from closing.170 
There are policy and doctrinal bases for the distinction Corwin draws 
between actions for injunctions and actions for damages. Corwin mentions 
the ability to provide real time relief with injunctions.171 The underlying no-
tion is that courts can correct board actions through injunctions without 
chilling necessary risk-taking in business by making directors liable for dam-
ages based upon hindsight. The distinction between actions for injunctions 
and actions for damages is also consistent with the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan where the court held that 
plaintiffs must prove a lack of good faith in order to recover damages in the 
face of a Section 102(b)(7) waiver even in a situation triggering Revlon.172 
The problem is that if the court grants an injunction before the share-
holders vote, then the shareholders will never see the deal. More precisely, 
even if they see a deal, it will not be the deal with precisely the same terms 
or context as existed prior to the court granting the injunction. If the underly-
ing policy behind Corwin is that shareholders, not judges, should decide if a 
deal is good for the shareholders, then it seems strange to employ heightened 
scrutiny under Revlon in order to prevent the shareholders from having the 
opportunity to vote on the deal without judicially-ordered adjustments. Put in 
doctrinal terms, it seems anomalous to apply heightened scrutiny to a deal 
under Revlon in order to prevent a shareholder vote that would cause the court 
to apply the business judgment rule to the same deal without whatever mod-
ifications or additional actions the court might order. On the other hand, de-
laying injunctions until the shareholders have a chance to vote under the 
terms and circumstances originally proposed, even if practical, would seem 
to eliminate Revlon scrutiny altogether. This is because if the shareholders 
vote down the deal, then there is no deal to challenge; whereas if the share-
holders approve the deal, Revlon scrutiny does not apply. 
One might argue that there is no conundrum and that the two rationales 
in Corwin are complementary. Post-closing damage actions may have a 
greater downside than pre-vote injunction actions due to the prospect of 
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chilling necessary risk-taking by the board. There may also be less need for 
post-closing damage actions because the shareholder vote provides assurance 
to the court that the deal is not bad. The problem with this argument is that 
even if injunction actions have less of a downside than damage actions, it still 
makes no sense to have heightened scrutiny, so long as one assumes that 
shareholder votes provide adequate protection against bad deals. Hence, the 
Corwin conundrum seemingly exposes a telling bit of judicial doubt. At the 
same time the court is expressing confidence in an informed and uncoerced 
shareholder vote as assurance against bad deals, the court’s discussion of in-
junctions suggests that the court does not really believe that an informed and 
uncoerced shareholder vote fully protects the shareholders. 
Two other Delaware Supreme Court decisions make this even more per-
plexing. The Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in C&J Energy Services, 
Inc. v. City of Miami General Employees’ & Sanitation Employees’ Retire-
ment Trust contains language undercutting the distinction Corwin seemingly 
creates between actions for damages after shareholders vote and seeking in-
junctions before the vote.173 This opinion reversed the Chancery Court’s 
grant of an injunction that blocked a merger and ordered the directors to shop 
for more bids.174 The Delaware Supreme Court’s highly contextual analysis 
goes off in so many directions that it is possible to find support in the resulting 
ink blot of reasoning for whatever proposition one wants regarding the appli-
cation of Revlon—thereby continuing the total obscurity in which the court’s 
opinions have shrouded the impact of Revlon. The simplest interpretation of 
C&J Energy Services, Inc. is to see it as a second reprimand of the Chancery 
Court for erroneously holding that Revlon establishes protocols for directors 
selling their company. Specifically, it rejects the notion that directors unable 
to prove their impeccable knowledge of the market must conduct a market 
test to establish that they are getting the best price for selling their com-
pany.175 An alternate interpretation is to limit Revlon to situations in which 
directors agree to deal protections or engage in other actions that block supe-
rior bids from emerging prior to the shareholder vote.176 As relevant to the 
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present discussion, however, the court also offers reassurance that sharehold-
ers could always vote down a bad deal as a further reason why an injunction 
was unnecessary.177 
Moving in the opposite direction, the Delaware Supreme Court’s post-
Corwin decision in Singh makes one wonder which end is the tail and which 
is the dog regarding the two rationales Corwin offered for not applying 
Revlon. Singh’s author, Justice Strine, who also wrote the Corwin opinion, 
remembered a Chancery Court opinion he wrote years earlier when he stated 
that plaintiffs, in the absence of a Section 102(b)(7) waiver and without re-
gard to shareholder approval, need to establish gross negligence in order to 
recover damages, even in a situation in which the challenged transaction 
would otherwise be subject to scrutiny under Revlon.178 This makes Corwin’s 
invocation of shareholder approval superfluous as the basis for applying the 
business judgment rule, rather than Revlon, to actions seeking damages.179 
Hence, but for Singh’s statement regarding the impact of shareholder ap-
proval on transactions already subject to the business judgment rule, Cor-
win’s discussion of the impact of shareholder approval might turn out to be 
nothing more than a big red herring. 
c. Corwin and Omnicare: Can Voting Yes Cure a Lack of Choice? 
As discussed earlier, the board’s agreement to deal protections is subject 
to heightened scrutiny under Omnicare and Unocal even in situations not 
triggering heightened scrutiny under Revlon.180 This raises the question of 
whether an informed and uncoerced vote of the shareholders approving a 
merger or sale subject to deal protections lowers the standard for judicial re-
view of the deal protections to the business judgment rule in situations in 
which Omnicare would otherwise have demanded review under the height-
ened standard of Unocal. 
So far, there is limited authority on this question. In In re Paramount 
Gold and Silver Stockholders Litigation, the Delaware Chancery Court stated 
that it was unnecessary to resolve the impact of Corwin on the standard for 
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reviewing deal protections because the deal protections in the case met the 
Omnicare/Unocal reasonableness standard.181 
At first glance, it seems difficult to disentangle Corwin’s impact on Om-
nicare and Unocal’s scrutiny of deal protections from Corwin’s impact on 
scrutiny under Revlon. This is because Revlon itself invalidated a deal pro-
tection: the asset lock-up given to the favored white-knight bidder.182 In Par-
amount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., another significant deci-
sion that found a breach of duty under Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court 
also invalidated deal protections in the merger agreement with a buyer fa-
vored by the board.183 
There is, however, a subtle, but potentially critical, difference in focus 
between Revlon and Omnicare. Revlon is concerned with the merits of the 
deal: did the directors get the best deal for the shareholders?184 In Revlon, the 
court held that the directors breached their duty in this regard because they 
favored one bid over another, not because the favored bid offered a higher 
price to the shareholders, but rather because it protected certain corporate 
creditors. The court held this was an impermissible consideration when 
choosing between two buyers who were offering to pay cash.185 Similarly, in 
QVC, the court held that the directors breached their duty by agreeing to sell 
the company to a bidder that offered the shareholders a package of cash and 
securities whose market value was considerably less than the market value of 
the package offered by a competing bidder.186 If the focus of the court’s in-
quiry is on the merits of the deal and whether the price is right, then a vote 
by informed and uncoerced shareholders that they like the deal seemingly 
makes the court’s intervention unnecessary. 
By contrast, Omnicare’s focus is whether the deal protections impermis-
sibly interfere with the shareholder’s ability to vote down a board-favored 
deal. Indeed, Omnicare applied Unocal scrutiny to deal protections based in 
large part upon the so-called conflicts of interest created by the tension be-
tween the directors’ desire to get their way in deciding about a merger versus 
the statutory power granted to shareholders to vote contrary to the board’s 
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wishes.187 Applying Unocal scrutiny, the court in Omnicare condemned the 
deal protections in the case because the protections rendered the merger ef-
fectively a done deal before the shareholders had a chance to formally vote 
on it.188 If the problem with deal protections is that they interfere with the 
practical ability of the shareholders to vote against the merger, then it makes 
no sense to say that the formal but preordained vote of shareholders in favor 
of the merger renders the court’s intervention unnecessary. 
Actually, the question of whether Corwin changes scrutiny of deal pro-
tections under Omnicare often may be moot because of the overlap between 
the scrutiny called for by Omnicare and the prerequisites for triggering the 
business judgment rule under Corwin. Corwin only lessens scrutiny to the 
business judgment rule if the shareholders are not coerced. Meanwhile, Om-
nicare holds that deal protections must pass muster under the Unocal test, as 
elaborated by subsequent Delaware case law. This means that deal protec-
tions cannot be coercive or preclusive.189 Hence, if the issue is whether the 
deal protections are coercive, Corwin and Omnicare arrive at the same place. 
This, however, forces us back to the problem of deciding what coercion 
is. Unfortunately, cases addressing whether deal protections are coercive 
have been no better on this score than the cases discussed earlier. Omnicare 
simply throws this label on the deal protections facing the court for reasons 
that are unexplained and defy rational explanation. The Omnicare board’s 
promise to bring the merger to a shareholder vote did not pressure the share-
holders to vote in favor of the merger. The agreements by Omnicare’s con-
trolling shareholders promising to vote in favor of the merger meant the mer-
ger would be approved, but there is no indication that the controlling share-
holders were pressured to enter the agreements for reasons beyond the merits 
of the deal. The fact that the voting agreements left the minority outvoted if 
it voted against the merger is no more coercive towards the minority than is 
any election.190 
Beyond Omnicare, the leading Delaware Supreme Court decision ad-
dressing coercion from deal protections is Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp.191 
Interestingly, the court dealt with the termination fees challenged in that case 
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under the rubric of liquidated damages, rather than fiduciary duty.192 The 
court held that a $550 million termination fee payable to the jilted party if the 
merger did not occur was a reasonable estimate of damages rather than an 
impermissible penalty.193 As relevant to the present discussion, the court re-
jected the plaintiff’s argument that the termination fee impermissibly coerced 
the shareholders into voting for the merger.194 The court conceded that the 
fee might have influenced shareholders to vote for the deal in order to avoid 
potential damage to the company.195 Nevertheless, the court held that the fee 
did not fall within the definition of coercion from Williams.196 Specifically, 
the court explained that because the termination fee was an integral part of 
the merger contract, the shareholders’ consideration of the fee’s impact was 
not a consideration of something other than the merits of the transaction and 
therefore not coercion.197 
If the Brazen decision means that every provision in a merger contract 
is part of the merits of the deal simply because it is in the contract and no 
provision in the merger contract can constitute coercion, then a provision in 
a merger contract allowing one company to destroy all of the other company’s 
property if the other company’s shareholders vote down the merger would 
not be coercion. Presumably what the court meant in Brazen was that insofar 
as the fee was an attempt to compensate the other side for a reasonable esti-
mate of its damages, rather than to pressure the shareholders, it was part of 
the deal’s merits and therefore not coercion. This, however, can lead back to 
the approach in which the definition of coercion depends upon what the court 
happens to think of the substantive merits of the challenged contract provi-
sion. Omnicare illustrates the hazard of such an untethered approach to iden-
tifying coercion.198 
Putting aside the overall test for coercion, one might analyze whether 
deal protections are potentially coercive by looking at their effects upon the 
shareholders’ thinking. If we use Brazen’s termination fees as an illustration, 
deal protections might influence the shareholders’ calculus of how to vote in 
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two ways. The first comes from the fees’ negative impact on the corporation 
if the shareholders vote down the merger. Specifically, voting down the mer-
ger in Brazen would cause the company to lose over half a billion dollars,199 
which, in turn, can lower the value of the shareholders’ stock. Depending 
upon the overall size of the company relative to the size of the fees, this could 
cause the shareholders to vote for a merger they dislike simply to avoid the 
alternative of having a much less valuable company and stock.200 
Alternately, deal protections such as the termination fees in Brazen in-
directly impact the shareholders’ calculus by deterring other prospective buy-
ers who will think twice about bidding more for a less valuable company.201 
Again, the impact depends upon the size of the fees relative to the size of the 
company. The effect of deterring prospective other buyers, however, raises a 
fundamental question: does depriving the shareholders of choice equal coer-
cion? 
At first glance, an affirmative answer seems obvious. After all, depriv-
ing the shareholders of possible better offers effectively pressures them to 
vote for the board-favored deal as the only game in town. On the other hand, 
if the purpose for the statutory requirement that shareholders approve a mer-
ger or sale is simply to give the shareholders an opportunity to assess the 
merits of the deal approved by the directors relative to the status quo of no 
deal at all, then the absence of other bids is not relevant to the merits of the 
transaction the shareholders are asked to approve. Whereas this might seem 
to be a blinkered way of viewing the decision, it is consistent with the histor-
ical purpose for the statutory requirement that shareholders approve mergers 
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and sales202 as well as the board’s gatekeeping role when it comes to corpo-
rate mergers.203 
At this point, Corwin’s prerequisites and Omnicare scrutiny start to di-
verge. This is because Delaware courts applying Omnicare to deal protections 
do not need to ask whether the impact of deterring other bidders is coercion 
of the shareholders. Omnicare, by applying Unocal to deal protections, con-
demns either coercion or preclusion in deal protections. Even if unreasonably 
deterring other bids is not coercion, it is preclusion.204 
This possible divergence between Corwin’s prerequisites and Om-
nicare/Unocal scrutiny of deal protections brings us to the nub of the question 
in evaluating Corwin’s application to deal protections: if shareholders vote 
in favor of a merger or sale, should it matter that deal protections might have 
deprived shareholders from seeing a different deal? The answer to this ques-
tion dictates whether Corwin should change the standard for reviewing deal 
protections. 
d. Corwin and Investment Banker Conflicts: Draining the Swamp? 
As explained earlier, heightened scrutiny of board decisions typically 
results from conflicts of interest by directors or persons controlling direc-
tors.205 Conflicts of interest by persons other than directors or persons con-
trolling directors, however, can also affect decisions to merge or sell the cor-
poration. Most notably, such conflicts arise when an investment banker pro-
vides advice and assistance to the target’s board in seeking the best deal; 
meanwhile the investment banker is attempting to sell services, often assis-
tance in raising money to finance the purchase, to a prospective buyer. Under 
such circumstances, the investment banker may steer the deal toward a buyer 
who will use its services instead of a higher paying buyer and may not push 
for the highest sales price (which makes it more difficult to raise financing). 
Particularly egregious cases of this sort—including hiding their buyer side 
activities from the target’s board—led to an injunction delaying the sale to 
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allow further bids in In re Del Monte Foods Co. Shareholders Litigation,206 
and a significant dollar award against the investment banker in RBC Capital 
Markets, LLC v. Jervis.207 
Although the conduct of the investment bankers in these cases justified 
condemnation, the Delaware courts had to engage in some contortions to get 
there. Unfortunately, a direct approach of condemning the investment bank-
ers for breaching a fiduciary duty to the shareholders encounters problems 
with regards to whether investment bankers are fiduciaries and, if so, whether 
their fiduciary relationship runs all the way to the shareholders.208 Instead, 
the courts in these cases took the indirect approach of holding that the invest-
ment bankers aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duty by the targets’ di-
rectors.209 
The trick to this approach is to find that directors, who were misled by 
the investment bankers and thus are more like victims than wrongdoers, 
breached their duty. Indeed, the more egregiously the investment banker 
acted in hiding a conflict from the board, the more difficult it is to say that 
directors should have discovered the conflict. Application of the business 
judgment rule seemingly would make this a bridge too far. Applying Revlon’s 
heightened scrutiny has allowed Delaware courts with a wink and a nod to 
determine that there is a sufficient breach of the directors’ duty in order to 
impose liability upon the investment bankers.210 At the same time, the handy 
presence of a Section 102(b)(7) waiver allows the court to avoid imposing 
liability upon individual directors. 
Corwin, however, might upset this kabuki dance. The previously dis-
cussed Singh case, due to its timing, presented the issue in a sharply cut set-
ting. Singh arose out of a merger of Zale’s. In a decision handed down shortly 
before Corwin, the Delaware Chancery Court applied heightened scrutiny 
under Revlon when holding that Zale’s directors breached their duty in being 
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unaware of their investment banker’s conflicts of interest.211 On rehearing 
after Corwin, the Chancery Court decided that, pursuant to Corwin, the share-
holders’ approval of Zale’s merger triggered the business judgment rule.212 
The Chancery Court then concluded that the board had not been grossly neg-
ligent in missing the conflicts, meaning that there was no breach of the direc-
tors’ duties and, therefore, the investment banker could not be liable for aid-
ing and abetting.213 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed.214 
Unfortunately, the Delaware Supreme Court’s short opinion is cryptic, 
consisting of two paragraphs in which the court criticized the Chancery 
Court’s approach while affirming the Chancery Court’s decision. As dis-
cussed earlier, the first paragraph criticized the Chancery Court’s decision to 
apply the gross negligence standard to a transaction approved by the share-
holders when, because the action sought damages, the standard was gross 
negligence even without shareholder approval.215 In a second paragraph, the 
Delaware Supreme Court criticized aspects of the Chancery Court’s treat-
ment of the claim against the investment banker.216 
In a curious sandwich of reasoning, the Delaware Supreme Court first 
criticized the Chancery Court’s holding that the investment banker had en-
gaged in intentional misconduct. Then, the court criticized the Chancery 
Court for suggesting that investment bankers cannot be liable for aiding and 
abetting the board’s breach of duty if the directors are protected from liability 
for damages by a Section 102(b)(7) waiver. Lastly, the court affirmed the dis-
missal of the claims against all parties based upon a fully informed share-
holder approval of the merger.217 The problem is that the middle and final 
layers of this sandwich might be philosophically inconsistent. 
In criticizing the Chancery Court’s suggestion that investment bankers 
cannot be liable when the directors cannot be liable due to a Section 102(b)(7) 
waiver, the Delaware Supreme Court pointed to the high degree of culpability 
required to impose liability upon the investment bankers for aiding and abet-
ting.218 Specifically, the court noted the investment bankers must have scien-
ter.219 Under these circumstances, the court explained, “To grant immunity to 
an advisor because its own clients were duped by it would be unprincipled 
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and would allow corporate advisors a level of unaccountability afforded to 
no other professionals in our society.”220 
Given this policy, why does the court then close by stating that share-
holder approval of the merger precluded a claim against all parties, including 
the investment bankers? Presumably, the investment banker’s conflicts must 
be disclosed to the shareholders before they vote. Although this prevents in-
vestment bankers from escaping the consequences of their actions by duping 
both the directors and the shareholders, it promotes litigation over the ade-
quacy of disclosure. More fundamentally, if the investment bankers disclose 
their misdeeds, the court’s statement seemingly puts the shareholders in a 
position in which they must either forgive the investment banker’s treachery 
or else lose a deal that is better than no deal at all. It is as if a stockbroker 
who embezzled some of the client’s funds could demand the client either for-
give the embezzlement or forgo the gains from any successful trades placed 
on the client’s behalf by the broker. This seems to “allow corporate advisors 
a level of unaccountability afforded to no other professionals in our soci-
ety.”221 In any event, it is unclear how seriously the court took this last part 
of its reasoning because the court was skeptical that the investment bankers 
had acted with sufficient scienter to be liable regardless of the shareholder 
vote.222 Indeed, reading over the entire paragraph makes it unclear whether 
the court even thought about the impact of Corwin on aiding and abetting 
liability for investment bankers. 
e. Corwin and Director Conflicts: Reconciling Differences 
As explained earlier, shareholder approval of transactions in which di-
rectors, but not controlling shareholders, have a conflict of interest returns 
scrutiny from the fairness test to the business judgment rule or to the related 
standard of waste.223 Corwin contains language, however, that seems to un-
dermine this rule. Specifically, the opinion states that the business judgment 
rule is the appropriate standard when shareholders approve “a merger that is 
not subject to the entire fairness standard of review.”224 In its conclusion, the 
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opinion repeats that the policy is to defer to the shareholders “when a trans-
action is not subject to the entire fairness standard.”225 Read literally, this 
suggests that shareholder approval no longer moves the level of scrutiny from 
fairness to the business judgment rule for mergers in which directors, but not 
controlling shareholders, have a conflict of interest. 
This language, however, came when the plaintiffs argued for heightened 
scrutiny under Revlon after their push for the fairness test failed because they 
were unable to establish that the other party to the merger was a controlling 
owner of their company.226 Moreover, had the plaintiffs shown that the other 
party was a controlling owner, then approval by a vote of disinterested share-
holders (a so-called majority-of-the-minority vote) would not, on its own, re-
turn matters to the business judgment rule rather than the fairness test.227 
Hence, the court’s language was correct for the situation that it faced in 
which, had the plaintiffs proven the buyer was a controlling owner, the stand-
ard would have been fairness regardless of the shareholder vote. The court 
never thought about the situation in which fairness is triggered due to con-
flicts on the board, rather than dealing with a controlling owner. 
After feeding the uncertainty,228 Delaware Chancery Court decisions 
have subsequently clarified that shareholder votes in the face of conflicted 
directors continue to return review to the business judgment rule.229 
Whereas subsequent Chancery Court decisions corrected this error in 
Corwin, Singh has introduced a different uncertainty. Specifically, it is un-
clear whether Singh’s statement that courts should not apply the business 
judgment rule/gross negligence standard in the face of shareholder approval, 
but rather should ordinarily dismiss the lawsuit, governs transactions in 
which directors have a conflict of interest. At first glance, the answer is neg-
ative: Singh was addressing a situation in which the business judgment 
rule/gross negligence standard would apply without regard to shareholder ap-
proval and the court was concerned that without further reducing the standard 
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898382, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 2017); In re Merge Healthcare Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 11388-
VCG, 2017 WL 395981, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2017); Larkin v. Shah, No. 10918-VCS, 2016 WL 
4485447, at *10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2016). 
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of review, shareholder approval would have no impact on such cases.230 This 
is not relevant to director conflicts. On the other hand, Singh’s discussion of 
the pointless nature of the waste standard seems as applicable to shareholder 
approval of conflicted director transactions as it is to transactions subject to 
the business judgment rule regardless of a shareholder vote. 
f. Corwin and Shareholder Conflicts: Keeping a Distance 
As just discussed, Corwin excluded from its reach transactions in which 
the fairness test applies because a controlling shareholder stands on the other 
side from the minority shareholders, such as a merger in which the controlling 
shareholder forces out the minority shareholders and keeps the entire owner-
ship for itself (a “freeze-out merger”). Naturally, shareholder approval of 
such a transaction based upon the votes of the controlling shareholder hardly 
protects the minority or serves as a substitute for judicial scrutiny of the deal’s 
fairness to the minority.231 This raises the question, however, as to what in-
fluence courts should accord to a vote by a majority of the minority share-
holders in favor of the transaction. 
As explained earlier, under Delaware law such a vote shifts the burden 
of proof on fairness from the majority or controlling shareholder to the com-
plaining minority shareholders.232 Nevertheless, Delaware courts have tradi-
tionally still subjected freeze-out mergers to the careful scrutiny of the fair-
ness test instead of applying the business judgment rule.233 The year before 
Corwin, however, the Delaware Supreme Court modified this approach. In 
Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., the Delaware Supreme Court held that a 
                                                                                                                           
 230 If, however, disinterested directors approved a transaction in which some of their fellow 
directors have a conflict, then the approval by disinterested directors returns scrutiny to the business 
judgment rule. See, e.g., Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114, 120 (Del. 2006) 
(stating that courts review a transaction involving a conflicted director under the business judgment 
standard as long as the transaction is approved by a majority of disinterested directors). Under such 
scenarios, Singh presumably applies. 
 231 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing how approval of a conflicted transac-
tion by a majority of interested shareholders does not move the standard of review from the fairness 
test to the business judgment presumption). The same is true in situations in which non-controlling 
shareholders have conflicting interests in the transaction. For this reason, the votes of conflicted 
minority shareholders should not count for purposes of Corwin. See Mordue, supra note 98, at 567 
(explaining that a majority of fully informed, uncoerced, and disinterested stockholders must ap-
prove a transaction in order to apply the business judgment presumption under Corwin). 
 232 See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 233 See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116–17 (Del. 1994) (stating that, due 
to the “nature of the underlying ‘interested’ transaction,” entire fairness remains the appropriate 
standard of review when an informed majority of the minority shareholders approve a transaction); 
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937–38 (Del. 1985) (stating that although approval of a 
merger by an informed majority of the minority shareholders shifts the burden away from the inter-
ested parties to the plaintiffs, the entire fairness standard is still the appropriate standard of review). 
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freeze-out merger conditioned on “approval of both an independent, ade-
quately-empowered Special Committee [of directors] that fulfills its duty of 
care, and the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stock-
holders” moves scrutiny from the fairness test to the business judgment 
rule.234 Subsequent cases have extended this approach to other mergers and 
sales in which the majority or controlling shareholder has conflicting interests 
from the minority shareholders.235 
At first glance, M&F Worldwide and Corwin seem to be arriving at the 
same destination through shareholder approval: application of the business 
judgment rule. Nevertheless, they contain a critical difference in the prereq-
uisites for getting there. Corwin simply focuses on the shareholders; were 
they fully informed and uncoerced?236 By contrast, M&F Worldwide also 
looks to the directors; were the directors who made the decision (the special 
committee of the board) independent and acting with due care?237 This, in 
turn, raises the question of why the difference exists. Specifically, why does 
a conflict by a controlling or majority shareholder require the court to exam-
ine the independence and due care of those directors tasked with approving 
the deal, whereas, in the absence of a controlling shareholder conflict, ap-
proval by the shareholders is enough to move the level of scrutiny? 
The answer is not that a controlling shareholder, by definition, controls 
a majority of the board,238 thereby necessitating a review of whether the spe-
cific directors tasked with approving the deal are independent. Such a ra-
tionale is inconsistent with the traditional rule when dealing with conflicts of 
interest among directors (as opposed to controlling shareholders). As dis-
cussed above,239 approval by disinterested shareholders will move review of 
a transaction involving conflicted directors to the business judgment rule or 
                                                                                                                           
 234 88 A.3d 635, 642 (Del. 2014) (emphasis omitted). 
 235 See, e.g., Olenik v. Lodzinski, No. 2017-0414-JRS, 2018 WL 3493092, at *24 (Del. Ch. 
July 20, 2018) (applying the business judgment rule to review a non-freeze-out merger where the 
controlling shareholder fully disclosed to the other shareholders its conflict and a Special Committee 
of directors negotiated with due care); Larkin, 2016 WL 4485447, at *9 (citing, in a non-freeze-out 
context, to M&F Worldwide’s dual protections that move judicial review from the fairness test to 
the business judgment rule). 
 236 See Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312 (limiting inquiry to whether the shareholders were fully in-
formed and uncoerced when deciding whether to apply the business judgment rule to a transaction 
not involving a controlling shareholder). 
 237 See M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 645 (considering whether a special committee of directors 
met its fiduciary duty of care when approving a transaction to determine whether to apply the busi-
ness judgment presumption). 
 238 See, e.g., Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1114–15 (determining that a shareholder was controlling be-
cause it controlled a majority of the board); In re Rouse Props., Inc., Fiduciary Litig., No. 12194-
VCS, 2018 WL 1226015, at *11–12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2018) (stating that the question of whether a 
shareholder is controlling depends upon whether the shareholder controlled the board). 
 239 See supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text. 
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to waste even if no disinterested directors approve the transaction (for exam-
ple, if all of the directors have an interest on the other side of the deal).240 
Moreover, M&F Worldwide’s requirement that the independent directors act 
with due care in order to trigger the business judgment rule is inconsistent 
with Singh’s refusal to look at due care in the face of shareholder approval. 
Over the years, the explanation Delaware courts have given for not in-
voking the business judgment rule upon approval of a transaction with a con-
trolling shareholder by a majority of the minority shareholders focused on the 
fear of retaliation.241 Specifically, minority shareholders might vote in favor 
of a deal they dislike because they fear retaliation of various sorts (such as 
cutting off dividends) if they vote against the controlling shareholder’s pro-
posed merger or other transaction.242 
One concern with this rationale is whether it explains the different treat-
ment of transactions in which directors, rather than controlling shareholders, 
have a conflict of interest. Shareholders asked to approve a transaction that 
involves a conflicted director might legitimately fear retaliation by the direc-
tors if the shareholders vote against approving the transaction. After all, di-
rectors are in control of the corporation,243 including deciding whether to de-
clare dividends. Perhaps the distinction is that shareholders have the ultimate 
power of counterretaliation against directors who are not also the majority 
shareholders—the ability to vote them out of office. At the same time, share-
holders lack a similar power of counterretaliation against a majority share-
holder. Yet, this distinction runs into the reality that shareholders in a public 
corporation are highly unlikely to unseat directors.244 
                                                                                                                           
 240 See, e.g., In re Inv’rs Bancorp, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 177 A.3d 1208, 1211 (Del. 2017) 
(noting the fact that all, as opposed to only some, directors received stock options did not matter in 
the court’s analysis of whether shareholder ratification would return review to the business judgment 
rule). 
 241 See, e.g., Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116–17 (suggesting that courts use the entire fairness standard 
instead of the business judgment rule when assessing approvals by a minority of shareholders due 
to risk of retaliation by the controlling shareholders); In re W. Nat’l Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 
15927, 2000 WL 710192, *26 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2000) (explaining that the rationale for applying 
the entire fairness review instead of the business judgment rule is due to the potential for controlling 
shareholders to retaliate against minority shareholders who refused to approve a transaction favored 
by the controlling shareholders). 
 242 E.g., Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116–17 (providing examples of why minority shareholders may 
vote for a transaction of which they disapprove due to the potential negative consequences brought 
about by the controlling shareholder); In re W. Nat’l, at *26 (explaining that controlling shareholders 
are able to retaliate against minority shareholders by implementing “some onerous and oppressive 
policy upon the public shareholders through board action”). 
 243 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2011 & Supp. 2018) (placing control of business 
and everyday affairs of a corporation in the hands of the board of directors). 
 244 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 682–
93 (2007) (discussing the difficulty shareholders face in replacing board members). 
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Beyond this, it is unclear how M&F Worldwide’s requirement for ap-
proval by independent directors is supposed to counter the retaliation prob-
lem. Indeed, unless directors are indifferent to remaining or would rather not 
remain directors, they are inherently susceptible to retaliation by a majority 
shareholder who can kick them off the board. 
g. Corwin and Appraisal Rights: Does This Add Up? 
Appraisal rights originated in the nineteenth century when corporation 
statutes abandoned the requirement that shareholders unanimously approve 
mergers.245 State legislatures worried on both constitutional law and fairness 
grounds about allowing mergers to alter the nature of minority shareholders’ 
investments over their objections.246 To ameliorate these concerns, the idea 
arose to give the shareholders, who dissented from the merger, the right to 
demand the corporation buy back their stock at a price determined by the 
court to be the fair value of the stock (hence the term appraisal rights).247 
Delaware’s corporation statute continues to provide for such rights.248 
Despite not technically involving a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, 
appraisal rights clash with Corwin’s deference to shareholder approval. Spe-
cifically, Corwin embodies the view that if most of the shareholders support 
the merger, courts should not second-guess the deal at the behest of dissenting 
shareholders. By contrast, appraisal rights exist to respect the views of the 
dissenting minority. 
Admittedly, the court does not directly address the merits of the merger 
in an appraisal proceeding. In fact, Delaware law precludes the court from 
considering the impact of the merger on the value of the dissenter’s stock.249 
Moreover, the court in an appraisal proceeding will not grant a damage award 
for all shareholders, including those who voted for the deal, much less enjoin 
the merger—albeit merger contracts often include a closing condition that 
limits the percentage of shareholders that exercise appraisal rights.250 Never-
                                                                                                                           
 245 See Mary Siegel, Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 
HARV. J. LEGIS. 79, 86–91 (1995) (providing history of the evolution of appraisal rights in the 
United States). 
 246 Id. 
 247 See id. at 89–91 (explaining that whereas shareholders were previously required to engage 
in litigation in order to receive the fair value of their shares, their ability to receive such compensa-
tion has since evolved into the appraisal rights that shareholders enjoy today). 
 248 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (West 2011 & Supp. 2018). 
 249 See id. § 262(h) (“[T]he Court shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any 
element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation.”). 
 250 See Matthew W. Abbott et al., Paul Weiss Discusses Appraisal Risk in Private Equity Trans-
actions, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June 12, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/06/
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theless, in demanding an appraisal, the dissenting shareholder bets that a ju-
dicial determination of the fair value of the stock will be greater than what 
the shareholder will receive in the merger. Hence, an appraisal ultimately in-
volves the court indirectly second-guessing the merits of the deal approved 
by the majority of the shareholders. This is contrary to Corwin’s underlying 
faith in and deference to the wisdom of the disinterested majority of share-
holders. 
One way to reconcile appraisal rights with Corwin would be to treat the 
merger price approved by a disinterested shareholder majority as the fair 
value of the dissenters’ stock. Although there has been some movement in 
this direction, this is not the rule.251 
In recent decisions, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed using the 
price resulting from arm’s length mergers approved by the shareholders to 
dictate the fair value of stock in appraisal proceedings.252 The court’s hold-
ings represent something of a compromise. Whereas the court reversed deci-
sions by the Delaware Chancery Court that either gave no or relatively little 
weight to the agreed merger price as evidence of fair value, it refused to adopt 
a presumption that a negotiated price arising from a competitive sale process 
is the fair market value.253 Instead, the court held that the appraisal provision 
in the corporations statute gives the Chancery Court discretion to look at all 
relevant factors in determining the fair value.254 Moreover, these decisions 
looked at the processes used by the target companies’ boards before accepting 
the price as significant evidence of fair value.255 Such an examination is pre-
cisely what Corwin and Singh state that shareholder approval precludes. 
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(discussing common closing conditions that are inserted into merger agreements by private equity 
firms). 
 251 See infra notes 252–255 and accompanying text. 
 252 See Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 5–6 (Del. 
2017) (considering the degree to which courts should consider the merger price when determining 
the fair value in perfecting an appraisal); DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 
A.3d 346, 348 (Del. 2017) (considering the respondent’s argument that the court should presume 
that the price of an arm’s length merger is the fair value of the stock price in an appraisal). 
 253 See Dell, 177 A.3d at 16, 37–38, 44 (holding that the Chancery Court’s refusal to give the 
merger price any weight in determining the fair value was erroneous, yet rejecting the presumption 
that the merger price is the fair value); DFC Global, 172 A.3d at 359, 366 (refusing to presume that 
the merger price alone can be used as the sole evidence of the share’s fair value). 
 254 Dell, 177 A.3d at 21–22; DFC Global, 172 A.3d at 366–67. 
 255 See Dell, 177 A.3d at 28–31 (“Here, it is clear that Dell’s sale process bore many of the 
same objective indicia of reliability that we found persuasive enough to diminish the resonance of 
any private equity carve out or similar such theory in DFC.”); DFC Global, 172 A.3d at 372–74 
(considering the market test provided by various parties that showed interest in buying the target 
company as evidence in determining the fair value). 
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III. BACK TO FIRST PRINCIPLES: WHAT IS SHAREHOLDER  
APPROVAL TELLING US? 
Corwin reflects the premise that a favorable vote by a majority of share-
holders, who are fully informed and not coerced (including by fear of a con-
trolling shareholder), is the best indication of the merits of a merger. The 
problem with this premise is that it ignores the nature of the choice before the 
shareholders and thus misses the disconnection between the justifications for 
heightened scrutiny and what shareholder approval signifies as far as the mer-
its of the deal. 
A. The Nature of the Shareholders’ Choice 
To understand what shareholder approval is telling us, it is necessary to 
contrast two different types of decisions. Simplifying what is really a spec-
trum, we can separate decisions into two polar types. At one pole are narrow 
binary decisions and at the other pole are nuanced or flexible decisions. Nar-
row binary decisions are like light switches—they are either on or off. Nu-
anced or flexible decisions, on the other hand, provide multiple options that 
often interrelate. 
An individual’s decision to enter a contract is a nuanced or flexible de-
cision. At any point before making the ultimate decision to enter the contract, 
the individual has multiple interrelated options: negotiate more over various 
terms, gather more information, shop around, or contract with someone else. 
Subject to the limit that it takes two to tango, an individual in choosing be-
tween these options knows that he or she retains a great deal of control over 
what happens next. 
The board’s statutory authority allows it the same sort of nuanced or 
flexible decision making with respect to merging or selling the corporation. 
Even if the board works through senior executives, the board has the authority 
to command those executives to do what the board decides,256 and, in issuing 
those commands, the board knows that it has the authority to dictate what the 
senior executives will do next. 
By contrast, the shareholder veto is a narrow binary decision. The share-
holders cannot command the board to merge or sell the company.257 They 
                                                                                                                           
 256 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2011 & Supp. 2018) (granting the board the 
authority to manage and direct the business and affairs of the corporation). 
 257 See Charleston Boot & Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore, 60 N.H. 85, 86–87 (N.H. 1880) (stating that 
the shareholders could not command the board of directors to wrap up the business); FRANKLIN A. 
GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 196 (2d ed. 2010) (“[S]hareholders cannot initiate, for instance, a 
merger or sale of all assets; they cannot negotiate the terms of such a merger or asset sale; they 
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cannot command the board to gather more information, to make a deal with 
someone else, or to negotiate over specific terms of the deal. The sharehold-
ers can simply say yes or no. If they reject the deal, they have no control over 
what the board does next, meaning they have no control over whether they 
will see another deal.258 
This means that the shareholders’ choice ultimately comes down to ask-
ing whether the deal before them is better than no deal at all. This explains 
why shareholders typically vote overwhelmingly for any deal that provides 
an immediate and significantly positive return. Understanding the narrow bi-
nary nature of the shareholders’ choice, in turn, allows us to crack many of 
the doctrinal mysteries raised by Corwin and to fashion a sensible approach 
to the impact of shareholder approval on judicial scrutiny of mergers and 
sales. 
B. Implications for Judicial Scrutiny 
1. Binary Choice and Corwin’s Prerequisites 
The binary nature of the shareholders’ choice explains some of the dif-
ficulties raised by Corwin’s two prerequisites: that shareholders be fully in-
formed and that shareholders not be coerced. To begin with, it helps explain 
the results of the Fisch, Griffith, and Solomon study showing that additional 
disclosures almost never change the shareholder vote. As discussed earlier, 
one interpretation of this result is to suggest that the disclosure failures in 
these cases did not involve material facts.259 The other interpretation, how-
ever, is that, at least in some instances, shareholders do not change their votes 
on mergers despite facts that, as in Morrison v. Berry and Appel v. Berkman, 
logic would dictate the shareholders should consider.260 
Perhaps this shows, contrary to Corwin’s underlying premise, that 
shareholders are poor decisionmakers who are unwilling to put in the time to 
consider important facts about the deal. Yet, the Fisch, Griffith, and Solomon 
study suggests that many shareholders react to the recommendations of the 
                                                                                                                           
cannot order the board to make such a deal, or set in advance the parameters of the deal the board 
should make . . . .”). 
 258 This analysis is based upon the statutory division of power between directors and sharehold-
ers. Majority or controlling shareholders have the practical, if not legal, ability to command the 
board and, thus, might make nuanced or flexible decisions regarding mergers. It is also possible in 
certain circumstances that so-called activist shareholders might exercise sufficient influence over 
the board to achieve some ability to make nuanced or flexible decisions regarding mergers. 
 259 See supra notes 122 and accompanying text. 
 260 See supra notes 99–110 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holdings of Morrison 
v. Berry, 191 A.3d 268, 274–73 (Del. 2018), and Appel v. Berkman, 180 A.3d 1055, 1057 (Del. 
2018)). 
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principal shareholder advisory service. One would think that such an organi-
zation would put in the time to consider negative corrective disclosures.261 
Instead, perhaps the mystery is partially solved by returning to the share-
holders’ narrow binary choice. Although Delaware court opinions do not tend 
to explain things this way,262 one suspects that facts subject to corrective dis-
closure raise questions about whether the deal before the shareholders was 
the best deal possible, rather than whether the deal is better than no deal at 
all. Again, however, we must remember the narrow nature of the sharehold-
ers’ choice. Facts suggesting that, for instance, because of conflicts or slop-
piness, the directors did not get the best deal do not mean that the deal at hand 
still is not better than the status quo. Moreover, these facts can make the 
shareholders doubt that the same conflicted or sloppy directors will manage 
to get a better deal if forced to go back and try again or whether they will 
even try again. 
Morrison and Appel provide good illustrations. If the board knew about 
the founder’s conflicted position in Morrison earlier, then it might have ne-
gotiated a better deal.263 This does not mean, however, that the deal the board 
negotiated was not a more attractive option than no sale or that the prudent 
thing to do for shareholders confronted with a narrow binary choice would 
be to reject the proposed deal and hope that the board and buyer come back 
with a better one. After all, the shareholders have no control over subsequent 
negotiations, if any, after they say no. Along similar lines, the founder’s di-
agnosis in Appel, if believed, provides important information to one in a po-
sition to make a nuanced or flexible decision (such as the board) because it 
suggests an alternative course to an immediate sale.264 Specifically, a deci-
sionmaker in a position to make nuanced or flexible decisions (like the board) 
can wait to sell the company while it first addresses the mismanagement 
problem. This is not a realistic option for the public shareholders asked to 
tender their stock. If the public shareholders decline the deal at hand, they 
have little ability to address the mismanagement and no assurance that a fu-
ture board will be as open to selling the company.265 
The narrow binary nature of the shareholders’ choice also helps explain 
the inherent limits to defining coercion. In the mergers and acquisitions con-
                                                                                                                           
 261 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 262 See, e.g., R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 17.2 (3d ed., 2018 supp.) (discussing the duty of disclosure 
to shareholders under Delaware cases). 
 263 See supra notes 107–111 and accompanying text (discussing the omissions in Morrison). 
 264 See supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text (discussing the omissions in Appel). 
 265 See supra notes 257 and accompanying text. 
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text, claims of coercion typically fall into one of two baskets. The first, com-
monly labeled structural coercion,266 consists of exploiting the problem pub-
lic shareholders face in coordinating a collective response. Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co. provides the classic illustration.267 There, the hostile 
two-tier tender offer pressured shareholders to accept, even though they 
might not find the price sufficient, in order to avoid being part of the minority 
holdouts that would get a worse deal.268 Shareholder votes, however, nor-
mally do not raise this structural coercion problem because voting against a 
deal when most other shareholders vote in favor of it generally does not prej-
udice the dissenters.269 
The other basket involves coercion claims resulting from the sharehold-
ers’ binary choice when called upon to approve a merger or sale. Sharehold-
ers simply have the option of voting yes or no on the deal as presented to 
them. They do not have the option to negotiate over various terms, such as 
the existence and size of termination fees (as in Brazen).270 They do not have 
control over the timing and context of the deal (for example, to stall the mer-
ger while carefully monitoring the effort to restate the earnings reports as the 
board could have done in Saba Software).271 Hence, the shareholders’ calcu-
lus of whether to vote yes or no on a merger or sale inevitably involves a 
package of terms and context for the deal that has been dictated to them. 
This is not to say that the combination of terms and circumstances pre-
sented to the shareholders on a take-it-or-leave-it basis in a merger contract 
automatically renders the process coercive. Rather, it indicates that attempt-
ing to define coercion by trying to distinguish the merits of the deal from 
extraneous terms is akin to Sisyphus pushing the boulder up the mountain. 
The upshot of this analysis is that the narrow binary nature of the share-
holders’ choice renders Corwin’s all-or-nothing focus on disclosure and co-
ercion too crude an approach for determining the impact of shareholder ap-
proval on the level of judicial scrutiny. 
                                                                                                                           
 266 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive 
Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 267 (1989) (defining 
structural coercion as “the risk that disparate treatment of non-tendering shareholders might distort 
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 267 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985). 
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 270 See supra notes 191–197 and accompanying text. 
 271 See supra notes 127–140 and accompanying text. 
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2. Binary Choice and Functional Equivalence 
Judicial scrutiny of board decisions traditionally begins, even without 
regard to shareholder approval, where Corwin itself ends: application of the 
highly deferential business judgment rule. Generally, greater scrutiny arises 
in situations in which we do not trust directors to act for the corporation and 
its shareholders because of some conflicting interest.272 Shareholder approval 
serves as a substitute for greater scrutiny because we trust shareholders to act 
for the right reasons (their own interest). The primary question presented by 
the interactions of shareholder approval with Delaware’s layer cake of stand-
ards is whether shareholder approval, given the narrow binary choice facing 
the shareholders, adequately substitutes for whatever heightened scrutiny the 
court would otherwise apply in light of the reasons for that heightened scru-
tiny. 
a. Achieving the Goals for Scrutiny Under Revlon, Omnicare, and Unocal 
We can start to answer the question of whether shareholder approval 
provides an adequate substitute for heightened scrutiny with the issue before 
the court in Corwin: whether to apply the intermediate level of heightened 
scrutiny under Revlon. Unfortunately, it is difficult to compare the efficacy 
of shareholder approval as a tool to achieve the purpose for heightened scru-
tiny under Revlon because the purpose for heightened scrutiny under Revlon 
is not clear.273 What we can say is that Revlon spoke of the board’s obligation 
to get the best price for the shareholders and that the case arose in the context 
in which the board was choosing between two prospective buyers.274 Both of 
these facts bear on the efficacy of shareholder approval as a substitute for 
heightened judicial scrutiny under Revlon. 
As stated before, the narrow binary nature of the shareholders’ choice in 
voting on a merger or sale means that shareholder approval is not a complete 
substitute for judicial scrutiny when it comes to seeing if the directors got the 
best deal or acted reasonably towards this goal. As repeatedly emphasized in 
this discussion, the issue before the shareholders is whether the deal in front 
of them is better than no deal, not whether it is the best deal. True, sharehold-
ers might reject a deal they find otherwise acceptable if they view it not to be 
the best deal because they hope that by doing so they will be presented with 
a better deal. Barring, however, the presence of a hostile competing bidder, 
shareholders have limited control over whether they will actually see a better 
                                                                                                                           
 272 See supra notes 25–33 (distinguishing between the business judgment rule and heightened 
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deal if they reject the one in front of them. Hence, the prudent course typically 
is to take the bird in the hand even in a situation in which a person in a posi-
tion to make nuanced or flexible decisions (the board) would pursue a differ-
ent path. This explains the studies showing that shareholders normally vote 
overwhelmingly in favor of mergers. 
At first glance, this suggests that Corwin got it wrong in holding that 
shareholder approval substitutes for heightened judicial scrutiny under 
Revlon when assessing whether the directors got the best deal in selling the 
company. Further reflection, however, might suggest instead an explanation 
for the Corwin conundrum. As discussed above, the court’s apparent holding 
that heightened scrutiny under Revlon applies in actions for injunctions be-
fore shareholders vote, but not in actions for damages after shareholders vote, 
only makes sense if the court has doubts about the efficacy of shareholder 
approval as protection for the shareholders.275 The impact of the narrow bi-
nary choice on the shareholder approval’s ability to ensure shareholders get 
the best deal explains such doubt. At the same time, the danger that damage 
awards might chill necessary risk-taking could justify confining heightened 
scrutiny to injunctive relief despite the limits of shareholder approval as a 
tool to protect shareholder interests. 
There is, however, a problem with this explanation: the business judg-
ment rule, which courts normally apply both to damage actions and to actions 
for injunctive relief,276 exists based upon the notion that courts should not ask 
whether disinterested directors got the best deal or otherwise made the best 
decision, but rather should confine review to whether the directors made a 
grossly negligent or irrational decision. Why then should a merger or sale 
involving transfer of control to a privately held party (or arguably any merger 
sale cashing out the shareholders) justify a greater level of scrutiny? This 
question, however, gets well beyond the topic of shareholder approval and is 
the subject for another article.277 
The fact that Revlon involved a situation in which the board was saying 
yes to one bidder (the white knight) while saying no to another bidder (the 
party making a hostile tender offer) also bears upon the efficacy of share-
holder approval to protect the shareholders.278 At first glance, this situation 
                                                                                                                           
 275 See supra 171–172 and accompanying text. See generally Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings 
LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). 
 276 E.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780–81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (applying the busi-
ness judgment rule in response to a complaint seeking an injunction ordering the board to install 
lights in a corporation’s baseball stadium). 
 277 See Gevurtz, supra note 190, at 456–64 (discussing the impact of Revlon on the standard of 
review used by courts when assessing corporate mergers). 
 278 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184 (addressing the favoritism displayed by the board towards the 
white knight over the hostile bidder). 
1884 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1831 
appears to ease the normally narrow binary choice involved with shareholder 
approval. The shareholders can vote against the deal presented to them by the 
board, not just to retain the status quo, but alternatively to accept the hostile 
tender offer. The problem, as illustrated by Revlon, arises from the board’s 
agreement to deal protections or taking other actions that block the hostile 
bid.279 This returns the shareholders to the binary choice of only voting yes 
or no on the deal in front of them without the option to choose the bid blocked 
by the board. 
Moreover, deal protections might not only block a competing bid of 
which the shareholders are aware, but also can deter competing bids from 
even surfacing in the first place.280 Hence, in voting on the bird in the hand 
represented by the deal before them, shareholders commonly never even 
know whether there was another potentially higher offer. True, fully informed 
shareholders would be aware of the deal protections and thereby the prospect 
of deterring better bids. The narrow binary nature of the shareholders’ choice, 
however, means that shareholders can only vote on the deal agreed to by the 
board, not on negotiating over specific deal protections. This puts the share-
holders in a position where they can either swallow the prospect that deal 
protections might have cut off a better deal or else put at risk the deal they 
have in the hope that their directors will return with a better combination of 
the deal and deal protections. Again, the prudent course for the shareholders 
is to take the bird in the hand. 
At this point, the impact of shareholder approval on scrutiny under 
Revlon should converge with its impact on scrutiny under Omnicare and Un-
ocal and returns us to the question posed earlier: in weighing the impact of 
shareholder approval, should it matter that directors cut off the choice of other 
deals that the shareholders might have preferred? To answer this question, we 
must ask why Omnicare imposed heightened scrutiny (Unocal) on deal pro-
tections. 
The court in Omnicare put forward essentially two reasons for applying 
Unocal. One reason lies in the tension between the directors’ desire to have 
their way on a merger versus the statutory power granted the shareholders to 
vote contrary to the board’s wishes.281 As explained in the earlier discussion, 
it makes little sense to subject deal protections to heightened scrutiny on the 
ground that they interfere with the shareholder’s practical ability to veto the 
board’s favored deal and, at the same time, hold that shareholder approval 
reduces the need for heightened scrutiny. The only question is whether this 
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concern with protecting the shareholder veto power simply exists for deal 
protections (like termination fees) that negatively impact the corporation if 
shareholders vote down the deal and thereby pressure the shareholders to vote 
for a deal they dislike, or whether the concern also exists for deal protections 
that simply chase away competing bidders. 
The other reason given by the court in Omnicare for heightened scrutiny 
is that the purpose and effect of deal protection devices is to fight off com-
peting offers, which means deal protections are much like poison pills or 
other takeover defenses subject to review under Unocal.282 Unocal, in turn, 
imposed heightened scrutiny on takeover defenses in order to address the om-
nipresent specter that, in combating hostile tender offers, directors might be 
motivated by the desire to preserve their positions rather than by the best in-
terest of the shareholders.283 Although this specter disappears if the buyer in 
a merger or sale favored by the board will not retain the current directors or 
management, it hovers over any situation in which the favored buyer will 
retain the current directors or management but a subsequent higher bidder 
might not. Indeed, empirical evidence supports the fear that directors and 
managers steer deals toward buyers that retain the current directors and man-
agers over prospective buyers who would have paid more.284 
The upshot of this discussion is that a critical justification for heightened 
scrutiny of deal protections under Omnicare and Unocal, as well as for 
heightened scrutiny of the board’s choice of the buyer under Revlon, is to 
address the concern that directors may be favoring a buyer who will retain 
them as a director over another prospective buyer who will not. If this is the 
goal, the narrow binary nature of the shareholders’ choice means that share-
holder approval is not an adequate substitute for heightened judicial scrutiny. 
Unless there is a hostile bid awaiting them upon rejecting the deal presented 
by the board, shareholders can only vote on the deal in front of them. Hence, 
so long as directors present shareholders with deals that are better than no 
deal, shareholder approval will not prevent directors from sacrificing the best 
deal for the shareholders in favor of a deal that preserves their own positions. 
b. Reconciling the Law Regarding Traditional Conflicts of Interest 
One potential objection to the analysis so far is that it is inconsistent 
with the impact of shareholder approval of transactions involving conflicts of 
interest for directors or parties controlling directors. It is possible, however, 
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to reconcile the above analysis with the treatment of most transactions in 
which directors have a conflict of interest. Furthermore, this analysis helps 
explain the current Delaware approach to transactions in which controlling 
shareholders have a conflict of interest. 
As stated earlier, approval by disinterested shareholders traditionally re-
turns judicial scrutiny of transactions in which directors (but not controlling 
shareholders) have a conflict of interest to the business judgment rule or the 
waste standard.285 One might argue, however, that the narrow binary nature 
of shareholder approval limits the efficacy of shareholder approval in the con-
text of traditional director conflicts as much as it does in the merger or sale 
context. If so, either the traditional rule regarding the impact of shareholder 
approval of transactions in which directors have a conflict of interest is wrong 
or we should disregard the narrow binary nature of the shareholders’ choice 
when dealing with challenges to mergers or sales. 
There is a difference, however, between the two contexts. Run-of-the-
mill conflict of interest transactions, such as executive compensation involv-
ing members of the board, do not involve transactions in which the essential 
question is whether the corporation should have contracted with a different 
party. Moreover, run-of-the-mill conflict of interest transactions do not in-
volve board actions, such as deal protections, whose essential purpose is to 
cut the shareholders off from seeing competing alternatives. In other words, 
the complaint in an executive compensation case is that the directors or senior 
executives overpaid themselves, not that they should have hired someone 
else.286 Hence, the fact that shareholders did not get to see other candidates 
does not undermine their assessment of the executive compensation they vote 
to approve. By contrast, the fact that deal protections or other board actions 
may have prevented the shareholders from considering other merger offers 
undermines the impact of the shareholders’ vote on showing they got the best 
deal.287 
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Turning to conflicts by controlling shareholders, Kahn v. M&F World-
wide Corp. becomes more understandable once one considers the sharehold-
ers’ narrow binary choice. Specifically, M&F Worldwide differs from Corwin 
in requiring not just approval by the minority shareholders, but also approval 
by independent directors acting with due care, before the court is willing to 
apply the business judgment rule to a freeze-out merger. Why the added re-
quirement for independent directors? The court explained that this provided 
the shareholders with the protection of having an agent bargain on their be-
half.288 Yet, if minority shareholders can protect themselves against poor 
terms in freeze-out mergers by vetoing a deal subject to a majority-of-the-
minority condition, why do we need an independent committee negotiating 
in order to ensure minority shareholders get a fair deal? 
The answer returns to the narrow binary nature of the shareholders’ 
choice in voting on the merger: shareholders can only vote up or down on the 
deal in front of them, they cannot vote on the deal not in front of them. Hence, 
a majority of the minority shareholders will approve any deal above their 
reservation price, but they lack the power to negotiate for a deal closer to the 
majority shareholder’s reservation price that they could have received if the 
board were negotiating the price paid by a stranger.289 If the definition of a 
fair deal is the price that would result from arm’s length dealing, the mini-
mum reservation price of a majority of the minority shareholders is not it.290 
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c. Remaining Goals for Judicial Scrutiny 
This brings us to the remaining interactions of shareholder approval with 
Delaware’s layer cake of standards for reviewing decisions to merge or sell 
the corporation. It will aid analysis to restructure our discussion of these in-
teractions into three categories: (1) complaints about sloppy process by the 
board; (2) complaints about investment bankers; and (3) circumstances in 
which the law embodies a counter-majoritarian goal (the waste doctrine and 
appraisal rights). 
As discussed earlier, Singh v. Attenborough potentially breathes new life 
into the prospect raised by Smith v. Van Gorkom, that approval of a merger 
by shareholders informed about the board’s sloppy process might insulate 
directors from claims for breaching a duty of care or even perhaps for not 
acting in good faith.291 Again, this may read too much into shareholder ap-
proval. To see why, in this instance, we must address the two possible reasons 
one might give for shareholder approval to insulate careless directors from 
liability. 
One reason is embodied in Van Gorkom’s reference to void versus void-
able acts.292 This would be relevant if the shareholders explicitly voted not to 
pursue an action against the directors. On the other hand, if the argument is 
that a vote to approve the merger is a vote to forgive the directors’ laxity, then 
the broader reading of Gantler v. Stephens as seeking to confine the impact 
of a statutorily required shareholder vote to just the question the shareholders 
were voting on was correct.293 Forgiveness is not what the shareholders are 
voting on when voting to approve a merger. Alternatively, one might invoke 
the concept of ratification in agency law under which a principal cannot both 
knowingly accept the benefits of an agent’s unauthorized action and, at the 
same time, complain that the agent lacked authority.294 Yet, whereas this may 
have sway when the issue is lack of authority, it is not clear why a party who 
is the victim of another’s carelessness (rather than lack of authority) must 
forgive the carelessness or forgo the benefits of any acts by the careless party. 
For example, a doctor who negligently fails to diagnose a disease before it 
harms the patient should not be able to argue that the victimized patient’s 
agreement to later treatment waives any claims for the injuries already suf-
fered. 
The alternative reason is that shareholder approval shows that the share-
holders like the deal and therefore the board’s sloppiness caused no damage. 
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The fact that the shareholders think the deal in front of them is better than no 
deal at all, however, does not necessarily mean that a better process at the 
outset could not have gotten a few extra dollars per share, even though the 
shareholders figure that by the time the merger came to them the opportunity 
to negotiate a better deal was gone. Alternatively, the shareholders might not 
want to take a chance on whether their sloppy board can do a better job next 
time. 
A similar analysis applies to cases in which conflicted investment bank-
ers attempt to force absolution by disclosing the bankers’ conflicts to the 
shareholders when the shareholders vote on the deal. As discussed earlier, it 
would provide investment bankers a cloak of unaccountability not enjoyed 
by other agents if bankers can foist upon the shareholders the choice of for-
going a deal or waiving claims for intentionally disloyal conduct.295 Again, 
the fact that the shareholders conclude that the deal in front of them, despite 
the investment banker’s conflict, is better than nothing, or better than taking 
their chances after the most opportune moment may have passed, does not 
show that the investment banker’s conflict did not harm the shareholders. 
Finally, we come to judicial scrutiny based upon a counter-majoritarian 
philosophy—in other words, based upon protecting the minority from foolish 
decisions by the majority. In these instances, approval by a majority vote of 
the shareholders, by definition, cannot fulfill the function of the judicial scru-
tiny—albeit for a different reason than the narrow binary nature of the share-
holder’s choice. The two relevant examples of counter-majoritarian-based 
scrutiny are the waste standard and appraisal rights. 
The waste standard is a derivation from the ultra vires doctrine.296 For 
much of its history, the ultra vires doctrine existed primarily to protect mi-
nority shareholders against actions that are beyond the purposes of the cor-
poration in which they agreed to invest.297 Hence, ultra vires actions histori-
cally could only proceed with the unanimous consent of the shareholders.298 
Waste stems from the notion that giving away corporate assets for no business 
purpose is beyond the purpose of a corporation established to conduct busi-
ness and that exchanging corporate assets for something that no reasonable 
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person would find of equivalent value is the same as giving away the differ-
ence.299 Hence, waste embodies the notion that minority shareholders are en-
titled to some minimal judicial scrutiny, at least in extreme cases, of the wis-
dom of what the majority of the shareholders vote to do. 
As a judicial construct, it is certainly open to the Delaware Supreme 
Court to eliminate the waste doctrine under Delaware corporate law. The 
same is not true of appraisal rights that exist by virtue of statute. As discussed 
earlier, the idea behind appraisal rights is to protect the minority from being 
forced to go along with the board and the majority of shareholders.300 This is 
why appraisal rights are also referred to as dissenters’ rights. As long as the 
legislature thinks it is necessary to protect dissenters from deals favored by 
the board and a majority of the shareholders, the Delaware Supreme Court 
has correctly refused to sabotage the legislative scheme by treating mergers 
approved by disinterested and careful directors and shareholders as conclu-
sively establishing the value of the dissenters’ stock. 
3. Comparing Litigation: The Problem of Second-Best Solutions 
In examining the ability of shareholder approval to achieve the goals of 
judicial scrutiny, we have considered only half the picture. One must also 
consider the limitations of judicial scrutiny itself when it comes to achieving 
its goals and at what costs. 
Judges like to repeat that they are not business experts, and so their as-
sessment of the merits of a merger or sale could be worse than that of the 
shareholders.301 It is worth noting, however, that the frequent merger litiga-
tion in Delaware courts both creates and demonstrates substantial sophistica-
tion by Delaware judges in dealing with mergers and acquisitions.302 As men-
tioned at the beginning of this Article, it also is no secret that a small industry 
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has developed in litigation challenging the majority of board decisions to 
merge, thereby imposing what many have referred to as a transaction tax on 
mergers and acquisitions.303 Enough has been said on these limits and down-
sides of merger litigation to avoid the need to belabor the points here. Bal-
ancing these limits and downsides of merger litigation against the evidence 
that directors and senior executives sacrifice shareholder premiums in favor 
of deals that retain their positions—which is something that shareholder ap-
proval often cannot prevent—is an empirical and judgmental question. Some 
have pointed to a decline in premiums received by shareholders since Corwin 
as suggesting that the court struck the wrong balance.304 
Returning to the theme about different types of decisions, it is useful to 
note that courts, unlike shareholders, are not limited to narrow binary deci-
sions (in the case of courts, of liability or not), but rather have the ability to 
make nuanced or flexible decisions. This is particularly the case in granting 
injunctive relief, when the court can order more shopping, or modify or elim-
inate deal protections or other terms.305 Indeed, the Fisch, Griffith, and Solo-
mon study found evidence that settlements amending merger agreements re-
ceive a positive reaction in shareholder votes.306 This insight, in turn, rein-
forces the conclusion that Corwin is more about remedies than it is about 
shareholder approval. 
This is not to say that Corwin might not have gone too far in blocking 
damage actions. There could be cases in which opportunities for a better deal 
have been irretrievably lost and no amount of injunctive relief will put 
Humpty Dumpty back together. In such instances, a little deterrence through 
a damage award might be entirely appropriate. This is especially so because 
Section 102(b)(7) waivers, as well as the scienter requirement for imposing 
aiding and abetting liability upon investment bankers, rule out damages ex-
cept in extreme cases anyway.307 
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CONCLUSION 
One can certainly question—and indeed I have elsewhere308—whether 
Delaware courts have gone too far in applying heightened scrutiny under 
Revlon to situations in which the decision to sell presented no particular con-
flict of interest for the directors. To the extent that Corwin provides a back-
door curb on applying Revlon to entirely disinterested decisions, this may be 
a good thing. In situations, however, in which the omnipresent specter of di-
rector self-interest haunts the transaction—as it does when directors favor a 
buyer who will retain them—more careful judicial scrutiny of whether the 
directors picked the best deal, as well as the tactics they use to protect their 
favored deal, is appropriate.309 Here, the ability of courts to provide a nuanced 
and flexible remedy can accord the shareholders protection that the narrow 
binary choice provided by shareholder approval cannot achieve.310 
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